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Stability and Endogenous Formation of Inventory Transshipment Networks
Xin Fang  Soo-Haeng Cho
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213
xfang@andrew.cmu.edu  soohaeng@andrew.cmu.edu
Abstract: This paper studies a cooperative game of inventory transshipment among multiple rms.
In this game, rms rst make their inventory decisions independently, and then decide collectively
how to transship excess inventories to satisfy unmet demands. In modeling transshipment, we use
networks of rms as the primitive, which o¤er a richer representation of relationships among rms by
taking the coalitions used in all previous studies as special cases. For any given cooperative network,
we construct a dual price allocation under which the network is stable for any residual demands and
supplies in the sense that no rms nd it more protable to form subnetworks. Under the allocation
based on the marginal contribution of each rm to its network (called the MJW value), we show
that various network structures such as complete, hub-spoke, and chain networks are stable only
under certain conditions on residual amounts. Moreover, these conditions di¤er across network
structures, implying that a network structure plays an important role in establishing the stability
of a decentralized transshipment system. While the previous coalition-based approach examines
only the grand coalition (i.e., the complete network), we nd the complete network tends to be less
stable than incomplete networks under the MJW value. Finally, we consider the case when rms
establish networks endogenously, and show that pairwise Nash stable networks underperform the
corresponding networks in centralized systems.
Subject classications: Games/group decisions: Cooperative. Networks. Inventory.
Area of review: Manufacturing, Service, and Supply Chain Operations.
1 Introduction
Networks are often used to represent relationships among multiple rms. In this paper, we inves-
tigate networks of rms that share inventory through transshipment. When rms are connected
in these networks, they can transship excess inventories (also called residual supplies) between
each other to satisfy unmet demands (also called residual demands). The benet of inventory
transshipment is straightforward. By joining a network of transshipment, rms can generate addi-
tional revenues by utilizing their otherwise unused inventories and demands. According to Narus
and Anderson (1996), transshipment can reduce inventory cost by 15% to 20% and the amount of
lost sales by as much as 75%. Due to these benets of transshipment, many manufacturers promote
inventory transshipment in their networks of independent retailers (Shao et al. 2011).
The importance of transshipment has been recognized well in the operations management (OM)
literature. In particular, our paper is related to the stream of research that studies transshipment of
inventories in decentralized systems. In these systems, multiple independent rms cooperate in order
to maximize their own prots. Thus a proper mechanism needs to be developed to ensure that rms
1
have incentives to participate in transshipment.1 The extant literature analyzes the incentives of
independent rms using the cooperative game theory based on the concept of coalitions. A coalition
is a set of rms, within which rms can share their excess inventories and unmet demands, and
thus generate additional prots from transshipment. When all rms belong to one coalition, such
a coalition is called the grand coalition. The prots from transshipment are allocated among rms
within a coalition according to a predetermined allocation rule. A central question of this research
stream is whether a certain allocation is in the core. When a core allocation is used, no subset of
rms has incentives to form subcoalitions by seceding from the grand coalition.
Our paper is distinguished from the previous research stream by analyzing transshipment net-
works in decentralized systems. As compared with a coalition-based cooperative game studied in the
literature, we consider a network-based cooperative game. Our network-based approach is funda-
mentally di¤erent from the coalition-based approach in the following two important aspects. First,
in a coalition-based game, any two rms within a coalition can share their residual demands or
supplies directly with each other, meaning that transshipment between two rms can occur without
the cooperation of other rms. In contrast, in a network-based game, a rm can share its residual
demands or supplies directly with the other rms to which the rm has links, and indirectly with
the other rms to which the rm has no direct links but is connected via other intermediate rms.
In the latter case, transshipment occurs only when all intermediate rms cooperate as well. To
illustrate this di¤erence, consider a market with three rms. Figure 1(a) shows the grand coalition
in this market. In a coalition-based game, all three rms can share their residuals with one another
only in the grand coalition. On the other hand, Figure 1(b)-(e) show that all three rms can share
their residuals with one another in four di¤erent types of networks: the complete network in which
all three rms are linked to each other (which is essentially the same as the grand coalition), and
three incomplete networks in which there is one link missing with respect to the complete network.
For example, in the incomplete network shown in Figure 1(c), rm 1 and rm 3 are connected
to each other through rm 2, and they can share residuals only when rm 2 cooperates. Second,
within a coalition, rms are distinguished by the amount of their residual demands or supplies. In
a network, rms are distinguished by their positions within the network as well as their residual
amounts. For example, in the network shown in Figure 1(c), rm 2 is positioned better than rms
1 and 3 because rms 1 and 3 can share their residuals only through rm 2, while rm 2 can share
1A similar incentive problem can occur even among di¤erent branches within the same rm. For example, in our
industry project with an energy distribution company, we observed that inventory transshipment occurred between
two branches that are located in di¤erent regions. In this company, each individual manager who operates a local
branch is evaluated based primarily on the performance of his/her own branch. Thus, in order for transshipment to
occur, two managers have to agree upon how the additional prot generated from transshipment is allocated.
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Figure 1: Coalition vs. network: (a) grand coalition, (b) complete network, and (c)-(e) incomplete
networks in which all three rms are connected.
its residuals directly with rm 1 or 3.
As illustrated in Figure 1, networks represent richer relationships among rms than coalitions
by taking coalitions as special cases. For this reason, there have been advances in the theory
of a network-based cooperative game, starting with Myerson (1977) who notes that there are
many intermediate possibilities between universal cooperation and no cooperation. Such partial
cooperation structures can be captured by networks, but not by coalitions. For example, in the
network shown in Figure 1(c), rm 1 and rm 3 have partnerships with rm 2, but not between each
other. A comprehensive review for the development of the theory and applications of a network-
based cooperative game can be found in Jackson (2006). Our paper is among the rst papers in
the OM literature that apply this theory to rmsoperational decisions.
The analysis of various networks is also important from a practical viewpoint. The complete
network is often too expensive to implement in practice due to the cost of establishing connections
(Jackson 2006). Several papers reviewed by Paterson et al. (2011) have analyzed the e¢ ciency
of incomplete networks in a centralized system where a central coordinator optimally determines
transshipment based on those networks given exogenously. In our paper, we do not assume the
existence of such a central coordinator; instead, we examine rms individual incentives to join
transshipment networks in a decentralized setting, and also analyze a situation in which rms build
their networks endogenously. The following examples further motivate our research:
 In a typical regional blood management system (e.g., Prastacos 1984, Fontaine et al. 2009),
multiple independent hospital blood banks set their own inventory levels for fresh units of whole
blood or red cells. When one blood bank experiences a shortage and has an urgent need for blood, it
needs to have it transshipped from another blood bank who has it in inventory. Such transshipment
occurs through a regional blood center (usually a large hospital) who re-distributes the unused units
of blood among smaller blood banks. Although a detailed arrangement of transshipment is fairly
complex, this system resembles a hub-spoke network depicted in Figure 1(c), in which a regional
blood center works as the hub and smaller blood banks work as spokes.
Many states in the United States require auto manufacturers to sell their cars through independent
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dealers (Ramsey and Bauerlein 2013). The availability of various models and colors are di¤erent
across dealers. If a dealer does not have a stock of the specic model desired by a consumer, a
common practice is to have it transshipped from another dealer who has it in inventory (Zhao and
Atkins 2009). To initiate such transshipment, a salesperson in the dealer shop rst needs to nd out
which dealers have a desired model in inventory. This can be done either through shared web-based
inquiry tools or through phone calls by the salesperson. Once the salesperson has found the model
available in others inventories, he needs to contact those other dealers and agrees upon various
terms and conditions for its transshipment. This process involves costs for labor and administrative
arrangements (Lien et al. 2011).
Similarly, decentralized transshipment networks are also used in industries such as machine tools
and repair parts (Narus and Anderson 1996) and trucking industry (Zhao and Atkins 2009). Duvall
(2000) reports that companies in a variety of sectors explore combining their inventories in either
physical or virtual warehouses.
To analyze a decentralized transshipment system, we develop a two-stage model that is similar
to those of Anupindi et al. (2001) and Granot and Soi´c (2003), but we consider the formation
of networks instead of coalitions in the prior work. In the rst stage, rms make their inventory
decisions independently under uncertain demands. After the realization of the demands, some
rms may have leftover inventories, while others may have unsatised demands. In the second
stage, the rms cooperate by transshipping residual supplies to satisfy residual demands. Then
the additional prots generated from transshipment are allocated among participants according
to a predetermined rule. We analyze this model backwards with emphasis on the second-stage
network analysis. Our second-stage analysis contains two parts: (1) examining the stability of an
existing network, and (2) predicting networks to be established by rms when there is no existing
network. Specically, in the rst part, we extend the concept of the core dened in a coalition-based
cooperative game of transshipment into a network-based cooperative game. In a coalition-based
cooperative game, to determine whether an allocation is in the core, one needs to show that no
subset of rms has an incentive to form subcoalitions by seceding from the grand coalition. On
the other hand, in a network-based cooperative game, we need to examine the incentives of rms
to form subnetworks by seceding from a given network. In the second part, we derive equilibrium
network structures when rms form networks endogenously under the allocation rule based on
rmsmarginal contributions to their networks. In this case, each rm simultaneously announces
a set of rms to which it wants to set up a link, and a link is established when two rms have
announced each other. For our rst-stage analysis, we investigate the inventory decisions of the
rms, and determine the conditions under which the Nash equilibrium inventory levels coincide
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with the inventory levels in a centralized system (i.e., the rst-best inventory levels).
Our main contributions are three-fold. First, we present a novel model of inventory transship-
ment networks, and construct a dual price allocation that is in the core for any network structures
and for any residual amounts. Second, we examine the allocation based on the marginal contri-
bution of each rm to its network that is proposed rst by Myerson (1977) and is rened later
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) (which we call the MJW value). Under this allocation, various
network structures such as complete, hub-spoke, and chain networks are stable only under certain
conditions on residual amounts. Moreover, these conditions di¤er across network structures, imply-
ing that a network structure plays an important role in establishing the stability of a decentralized
distribution system. While the previous coalition-based approach examines only the grand coalition
(i.e., complete network), we nd that the complete network tends to be less stable than incomplete
networks under the MJW value. Finally, while the previous OM literature on supply chain networks
(as reviewed by Netessine 2009) commonly assumes that a network of rms is given exogenously, we
analyze the case when rms establish networks endogenously, and show that pairwise Nash stable
networks underperform the corresponding networks in centralized systems.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the stream of research that studies transshipment of inventories in decentral-
ized systems. For a comprehensive survey of the literature on inventory transshipment, the reader
is referred to Paterson et al. (2011).
Two pioneering papers in this stream are Anupindi et al. (2001) and Granot and Soi´c (2003).
Similar to our model (except that we take a network approach), Anupindi et al. (2001) analyze a
two-stage game among multiple rms that sell a common product. They show that a dual price
allocation is always in the core in the second stage of transshipment. In addition, for the rst-stage
decisions, they establish conditions under which the Nash equilibrium inventory levels coincide with
the inventory levels in a centralized system. While Anupindi et al. (2001) assume that rms share
all residual demands and supplies, Granot and Soi´c (2003) consider a model in which each rm
decides the amount of its residuals it wants to share with other rms. They show that the dual
price allocation, although it is in the core, fails to induce the rms to share all of their residuals.
Alternatively, the allocation based on the Shapley value (Shapley 1953), which allocates prots
according to rmsmarginal contributions to their coalitions, induces the rms to share all of their
residuals, but it is not always in the core.
Several researchers have studied transshipment in vertically decentralized supply chains. Dong
and Rudi (2004) and Zhang (2005) consider transshipment in a two-tier supply chain, where a
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supplier sells to a single downstream rm with several locations. Slikker et al. (2005) consider a
newsvendor game in a supply chain with a single supplier and multiple retailers who coordinate their
orders to the supplier. They show that the game has a non-empty core. Özen et al. (2008) consider
a supply chain in which multiple rms coordinate their orders supplied from multiple warehouses
to increase their joint prots. Kemahl¬o¼glu-Ziya and Bartholdi (2011) study the use of the Shapley
value when a supplier and multiple retailers whose orders are lled from the common pool can
form an inventory-pooling coalition. Shao et al. (2011) analyze the case in which a supplier sells
to multiple independent rms, and compare their results with those in the case where the rms are
under joint ownership.
There are some papers including Zhao et al. (2005), Rong et al. (2010), and Huang and
Soi´c (2010a) that analyze transshipment games in multiple periods. In particular, Huang and
Soi´c (2010a) extend Granot and Soi´c (2003) into a repeated game, and show that it is a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium for rms to share all of their residuals under the dual price allocation when
a discount factor is su¢ ciently high. Soi´c (2006) extends Granot and Soi´c (2003) by proving that,
although the Shapley value is not always in the core, the grand coalition is farsighted stable in the
sense that no rms will secede from the grand coalition if they consider how others would react to
their actions.
Another stream of research studies the role of transshipment prices for distribution of residual
prots. Using non-cooperative game theory, Rudi et al. (2001) and Hu et al. (2007) analyze a model
in which the residual prot from transshipment is allocated between two rms using predetermined
prices. Rudi et al. (2001) develop the expressions for transshipment prices that achieve a rst-best
outcome. Hu et al. (2007) extend Rudi et al. (2001) by considering the case when there are
nite and uncertain capacities. When multiple rms cooperate in transshipment, Huang and Soi´c
(2010b) compare the performance of the two methods: the use of predetermined prices and the
dual price allocation. They show that neither allocation method dominates the other.
To our knowledge, Hezarkhani and Kubiak (2010) is the only work that analyzes the decentral-
ized transshipment problem using the concept of pairwise stability. They study a matching problem
in a two-sided market in which a link is established only between a rm with residual supplies and
a rm with residual demands. The core allocation they consider is from the coalition-based coop-
erative game, which does not take into account any network structure. In contrast, we allow for
general network structures under which any two rms can build links, and both direct transship-
ment between two rms and indirect transshipment through intermediate rms are possible. Thus,
in our model, rmspositions in a network play a critical role in establishing stability results.
While our paper focuses on the inventory transshipment problem, cooperative game theory
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has been applied to several other problems in the OM literature. These include bargaining in
supply chains (e.g., Reyniers and Tapiero 1995), alliance formation among competing rms (e.g.,
Nagarajan and Soi´c 2007), decentralized assembly systems (e.g., Granot and Yin 2008, Nagarajan
and Soi´c. 2009, Yin 2010), group buying (e.g., Chen and Yin 2010, Nagarajan et al. 2010), and
capacity allocation and scheduling (e.g., Hall and Liu 2010). Readers are referred to Nagarajan
and Soi´c (2008) for the review of early work. Note that all these papers analyze coalition-based
cooperative games.
Our paper contributes to this literature by applying the theory of social and economic networks
to the decentralized inventory transshipment problem. Our network-based approach provides a
richer form of representing relationships among rms than the previous coalition-based approach,
and enables us to establish the stability of partial cooperation structures based on networks.
3 Coalition-Based Cooperative Transshipment Games
In this section, we rst describe the simplied variant of the model in Anupindi et al. (2001), which
excludes the possibility of storing stocks at commonly shared warehouses. This variant has also
been used by Granot and Soi´c (2003) in comparing their work with Anupindi et al. (2001). We
then introduce some concepts of coalition-based cooperative game theory, and summarize the main
results of those two papers. This will help understand how the previous coalition-based approach
di¤ers from our network-based approach that will be presented in subsequent sections.
Consider a set N = f1; 2; :::; ng of rms who sell a common product. The rms make decisions
in two stages as follows. In the rst stage, each rm i 2 N determines its order quantity Xi
under uncertain demand Di by taking into consideration other rmsinventory decisions as well
as transshipment in the following stage. Dene inventory prole X = fX1; :::; Xng and demand
prole D = fD1; :::; Dng:2 Let ci denote a unit ordering cost. After the rms receive what they have
ordered, demands are realized. Firm i generates revenue ri for each unit of the demand satised,
and any excess inventory can be salvaged at ui (< ri) per unit. The model assumes that each
rm satises its own demand rst using its local inventory, and then ship any excess inventories to
satisfy unmet demands of other rms. Let Hi = maxfXi Di; 0g and Ei = maxfDi Xi; 0g denote
the residual supply and demand of rm i, respectively. In the second stage, the rms transship the
residual supplies to satisfy the residual demands. Throughout the paper, we limit our interest to the
case where at least one rm has residual demand and at least one rm has residual supply because
otherwise no transshipment will occur. Let Yij denote the number of units shipped from rm i
2This model allows the demand of some rm i, Di, to be zero. Such rms can be viewed as independent warehouses
that are built only for transshipment.
7
to rm j, and let tij denote the unit transportation cost associated with this shipment. Further,
dene transshipment pattern Y = fYij : i; j = 1; :::; ng. Since both rms with residual supplies and
rms with residual demands contribute to the additional prots generated from transshipment, the
prots are allocated among these rms according to a predetermined allocation rule.
To characterize the transshipment in the second stage of the game, Anupindi et al. (2001) and
Granot and Soi´c (2003) use the concepts from coalition-based cooperative game theory. A pair
(N;w) is called a cooperative game, in which w : 2N ! R is a characteristic function of the game.
A subset S of N is called a coalition and N itself is the grand coalition. The characteristic function
w(S) captures the value generated by a coalition S. An allocation rule in a cooperative game is a
function  :W (N)! Rn, whereW (N) is a set of all such games on the set N . An allocation rule is
e¢ cient if
P
i2N
i(w) = w(N): An e¢ cient allocation rule species how much of the value generated
by the grand coalition is attributed to each rm. We consider only e¢ cient allocation rules in
this paper. When an allocation rule applies to a particular game (N;w), we call it an allocation,
denoted as ' = f'1; :::; 'ng. The core denes a set of allocations with a stability property. We say
that an e¢ cient allocation ' is a member of the core of (N;w) if
P
i2S
'i  w(S) for all S  N ; i.e.,
for any subset of rms, the sum of allocations they receive in the grand coalition is at least as large
as the value that they can generate by forming a subcoalition. A core allocation leads to a stable
outcome of the cooperative game in the sense that no subset of rms has an incentive to secede
from the grand coalition.
The allocation mainly considered by Anupindi et al. (2001) is a dual price allocation. To nd
dual prices to be used in this allocation, they rst formulate the centralized transshipment problem
in which a single decision-maker optimizes a transshipment pattern of all rms. Specically, given
inventory proleX and demand proleD, the central decision-maker solves the following program:
CTP (X;D) = max
Y
X
i;j2N
(rj   ui   tij)Yij (1)
s:t:
X
j2N
Yji  Ei 8i 2 N (2)X
j2N
Yij  Hi 8i 2 N (3)
Yij  0 8i; j 2 N: (4)
In (1), (rj   ui   tij) represents the prot of transshipping one unit of inventory from i to j. The
constraints in (2) ensure that the number of units transshipped to rm i does not exceed its residual
demand Ei. The constraints in (3) ensure that the number of units transshipped from rm i does
not exceed its residual supply Hi. Let i and i be the dual prices associated with the constraints
in (2) and (3), respectively. According to the dual price allocation, each rm i 2 N is allocated
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iEi + iHi. The main result of Anupindi et al. (2001) is that the dual allocation is in the core of
the cooperative transshipment game for any residual supplies and demands.
Instead of the dual price allocation, Granot and Soi´c (2003) consider the Shapley value (Shapley
1953). The Shapley value has many desirable properties such as symmetry, e¢ ciency, and additivity
(see details in Shapley (1953) or Granot and Soi´c (2003)), and hence it is commonly used in the
literature. The allocation rule based on the Shapley value is dened as follows: for rm i 2 N;
SVi (w) =
X
SNnfig
fw(S [ fig)  w(S)g

#S!(n #S   1)!
n!

; (5)
where #S is the number of rms in S. The standard interpretation of the Shapley value is as
follows (e.g., in Jackson (2006)). Consider all possible orderings of rms. For each ordering,
consider building a society by adding one rm at a time into that order. A rm obtains the
marginal contribution that she/he makes to the society when added to the coalition formed by
the rms before her/him in the order. So, a rm i whose place in the order follows a coalition S
receives value w(S [ fig) w(S). Since there are #S!(n #S   1)! such orderings, averaging over
all possible orderings n! leads to the Shapley value. Granot and Soi´c (2003) have shown that the
Shapley value is not always in the core of the cooperative transshipment game although it induces
the rms to share all their residuals.
4 Network-Based Cooperative Transshipment Games
This section is organized as follows. In §4.1, we present our network model of the decentralized
transshipment problem, and describe the concepts of network-based cooperative game theory that
we use to analyze our model. In §4.2, we examine whether the pair of a given network and a dual
price allocation is always in the core of the transshipment game. Finally, in §4.3, we examine the
conditions under which the MJW value is in the core for various network structures. Throughout
this section, we highlight the di¤erence between our network-based approach and the coalition-
based approach reviewed in §3.
4.1 Model of Transshipment Networks
Our model has the same sequence of the decisions as in the previous coalition-based model described
in §3. The main di¤erence is that transshipment in the second stage of our model occurs based on
a given network g. A node in g represents a rm in N = f1; 2; :::; ng. We call a rm with residual
supply a supply node, and call a rm with residual demand a demand node. A bidirectional link
ij between nodes i and j represents a partnership between rm i and rm j; so that two rms
can transship inventory directly between each other. We write ij 2 g to indicate that nodes i
and j are linked in the network g, and describe a network with a set of links. For example, for
9
Figure 2: Subnetworks of the network g0 = f12; 23g : (a) g0jf1;2g; (b) g0jf2;3g; (c) g0jf1;3g; (d) g0jf1g;
(e) g0jf2g; and (f) g0jf3g:
N = f1; 2; 3g; g = f12; 23g represents a network with two links: one link between nodes 1 and 2 and
the other link between nodes 2 and 3. In the case of a regional blood management system, we may
represent a regional blood center as node 2, and two blood banks as nodes 1 and 3 that share their
residual supplies and demands through the regional blood center. We denote the network obtained
by adding link ij to g by g + ij, and denote the network obtained by deleting link ij from g by
g  ij. Further, we use gN to denote the complete network on N in which a link exists between any
two nodes i; j 2 N . A path between rms i and j in g is a sequence of rms i1; i2; :::; i such that
ikik+1 2 g for each k 2 f1; 2; :::;    1g with i1 = i and i = j. Transshipment can occur between
two rms directly through a link between them or indirectly through a path between them. We use
Yij to denote the number of units shipped directly from rm i to rm j: If Hi units of inventories
are shipped indirectly from rm i to rm j through a path i1; i2; :::; i with i1 = i and i = j, then
we have Yikik+1 = Hi for k = f1; 2; ::;   1g:
We use the solution concepts in a network-based cooperative game proposed by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996). In this game, the value of a coalition not only depends on the amount of residuals
of its members, but also on the structure of the network formed by its members. Similar to the
characteristic function in the coalition-based approach, the value function in the network setting
is dened as v : G(N) ! R, where G(N) denotes a set of all possible networks over N . An
allocation rule in a cooperative game can be extended naturally into the network setting as a
function  : G(N) V (N)! Rn; in which V (N) represents the set of all possible value functions
for a society N . Since allocations depend on the structure of a network, so does the specication
of the core. We say that a pair of a network and an e¢ cient allocation, (g; '), is a member of the
core of (N; v) if
P
i2S
'i(g)  v(gjS) for all S  N; where gjS means a subnetwork of g restricted to
the rms in S: For example, Figure 2 shows all subnetworks of the network f12; 23g (denote as g0)
shown earlier in Figure 1(c). The requirement of the core is that no subnetworks can deviate and
generate a higher value than what they are being allocated in the initial network g: So, the core
allocation is stable to deviations from the network g.
Given inventory prole X and demand prole D, the value function v in our model species
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the maximum prot that any subnetwork gjS can generate through transshipment. Specically, we
dene v as follows:
v(gjS) = max
Y
X
i2S
24ai
0@ X
j2Bi(gjS)
Yji  
X
j2Bi(gjS)
Yij
1A  X
j2Bi(gjS)
Yij(tij + ui   uj)
35 (6)
s:t:
X
j2Bi(gjS)
Yji  
X
j2Bi(gjS)
Yij  Ei 8i 2 S (7)
X
j2Bi(gjS)
Yij  
X
j2Bi(gjS)
Yji  Hi 8i 2 S (8)
Yij  0 8i; j 2 S; (9)
where Bi(g) denotes the set of nodes that have a link to node i in g; and ai is dened as ri  ui for
i 2 S with Ei > 0; and 0 for i 2 S with Ei = 0: In (6), ai(
P
j2Bi(gjS)
Yji  
P
j2Bi(gjS)
Yij) represents the
net revenue from transshipment, and
P
j2Bi(gjS)
Yij(tij +ui uj) represents the cost of transshipment
which includes transportation costs and di¤erences in salvage values. The constraints given in (7)
(resp., in (8)) ensure that the di¤erence between the number of units shipped to rm i and that
from rm i does not exceed the residual demand (resp., supply) of rm i. Note that v(gjS) depends
on inventory prole X and demand prole D, but we suppress (X;D) for notational convenience.
In the rest of this paper, we refer to the program (6)-(9) as the transshipment problem within S,
and denote its optimal transshipment pattern by Y gjS .
4.2 Dual Price Allocation in Transshipment Networks
This subsection examines whether or not a pair of a given network g and the dual price allocation
is in the core of our network-based transshipment game. Anupindi et al. (2001) have shown that
the dual price allocation is always in the core when transshipment occurs among members of a
coalition. Because the grand coalition is essentially the same as the complete network, a pair of
the complete network and the dual price allocation is also in the core of our network-based game.
To examine whether or not a pair of an incomplete network and the dual allocation is in the
core, we rene the dual price allocation of Anupindi et al. (2001) such that it depends on the
structure of a given network g. Similar to CTP (X;D) given in (1)-(4), we dene the centralized
transshipment problem CTP (g;X;D) for a network g as the program (6)-(9) with S = N . Then
the dual price allocation 'DP (g) allocates giEi+ 
g
iHi to rm i 2 N , where gi and gi are the dual
prices associated with the constraints (7) and (8) with S = N in the network g, respectively. To
illustrate the dual price allocation 'DP (g) in the network-based transshipment game, consider the
following example from Anupindi et al. (2001):
Example 1: Suppose that ri = 10 ($/unit); ui = 5 ($/unit); tij = 1 ($/unit) 8i; j 2 N =
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Figure 3: Examples of networks when four rms exist in the market: (a) the complete network
gf1;2;3;4g = f12; 13; 14; 23; 24; 34g; and (b) chain f12; 23; 34; 14g.
f1; 2; 3; 4g; and that H1 = H2 = H3 = 2 (units) and E4 = 10 (units).
When the grand coalition or the complete network is formed as shown in Figure 3(a), the total
prot from transshipment is: minfH1+H2+H3; E4g(ri ui tij) = 6 (units)  4 ($/unit) = $24:
Anupindi et al. (2001) have shown that the dual price allocation based on the program given in (1)-
(4) is f$8; $8; $8; 0g: This allocation assigns all prots from transshipment to rms 1, 2, and 3 with
residual supplies, and none to rm 4 with residual demands because the total residual demands of 10
units are much larger than the total residual supplies of 6 units. Next, consider a chainnetwork of
f12; 23; 34; 14g as shown in Figure 3(b). In this network, the maximum prot from transshipment is
$22 because rm 2 has to ship its residual supplies of 2 units to rm 4 via rm 1 or rm 3; incurring
an additional transportation cost of $2. Now suppose that rms 1; 2, and 3 still receive the same
allocation, so that each of these rms receives $22=3. Then this network is no longer stable because
a subnetwork of rms 1; 3; and 4 can generate a total prot of 4 (units)  4 ($/unit) = $16; which
is larger than the sum of allocations, $44=3; they receive under the initial network. To prevent rms
1, 3 and 4 from forming a subnetwork, our dual price allocation based on CTP (g;X;D) decreases
the allocation of rm 2 by $2; so that 'DP (f12; 23; 34; 14g) = f$8; $6; $8; 0g: It is important to
observe that rm 2 has a worse position in the network than rms 1 and 3 because rm 2 is not
linked directly to rm 4 which is the only demand node in this example.
The above example highlights that the dual price allocation 'DP (g) takes into account the
position of a rm in the network g as well as the amount of its residual supply or demand. More
generally, we can establish the following result about the stability of a network under the dual price
allocation. All proofs are provided in Appendix.
Proposition 1 For any given network g; the pair (g; 'DP (g)) is in the core of the network-based
cooperative game (N; v) for any residual supplies and demands.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the dual price allocation is an ideal allocation for the stability
of incomplete networks as well as the complete network. This result may not be surprising if one
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could note that the dual price allocation based on CTP (X;D) under the coalition-based approach
could yield the same allocation as 'DP based on CTP (g;X;D) under our network-based approach.
To understand this, note the following di¤erence between CTP (X;D) and CTP (g;X;D). Our
network-based approach explicitly models the actual path i1; i2; :::; i with i1 = i and i = j over
which inventories are transshipped between any two rms i and j in a network. As a result, the
solution of CTP (g;X;D) provides us with the optimal path for transshipment between any two
rms i and j among a number of potential paths between those two rms. In contrast, the coalition-
based approach species one transportation cost tij of transshipment between any two rms i and
j; this means that a decision-maker needs to choose one path a priori among a number of potential
paths between rms i and j. If we redene transportation costs under the coalition-based approach
such that they reect actual transshipment paths (i.e., set tij equal to a minimum transportation
cost among all paths between every pair of nodes i and j in a network), then this approach yields the
same allocation as 'DP under our network-based approach.3 Therefore, the dual price allocation
is in the core of our cooperative game for any network g.
The implication of Proposition 1 is as follows: If the goal of an allocation mechanism is to
maximize the cooperation of independent rms, thereby maximizing the total value generated
from transshipment, then the dual price allocation can achieve this goal. For example, in a blood
management system, the transshipment of unused units of blood can potentially save the lives of
people who urgently need those units. For a non-prot association of local blood banks, the dual
price allocation can incentivize independent blood banks to participate in this cooperative network.
Despite the core property of the dual price allocation, the dual price allocation may not be
intuitively appealing. For instance, in Example 1, rm 4 is the only demand node in the network
(without which no subnetwork can generate any prot from transshipment), but receives zero
allocation. In fact, by the denition of dual prices, if the constraints (7) and (8) associated with a
rm are not binding, then the rm receives zero under the dual price allocation. Thus, as shown
by Granot and Soi´c (2003), if rms can choose how much residual demand or supply to share,
then they may not share all of their residuals under the dual price allocation; on the other hand,
the allocation based on the Shapley value induces rms to share all of their residuals because rms
can receive a larger allocation by doing so when the allocation is determined according to rms
marginal contributions. (We can easily show that this result continues to hold in our network
setting.) For this reason, the allocation based on rmsmarginal contributions is more commonly
3For instance, if we set t13 = t24 = t31 = t42 = 2 ($/unit) in Example 1, the coalition-based approach yields the
same dual price allocation as the network-based approach. However, the computation of minimum transportation
costs may become complicated as the number of rms and the complexity of a network structure increase because
one needs to solve an optimization problem for every pair of nodes in the network.
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used in the literature (see §2). We next examine the stability of a network under the allocation
based on the marginal contribution of each rm to its network, i.e., the MJW value.
4.3 Allocation Based on Marginal Contributions in Transshipment Networks
In this subsection, we examine whether or not the pair of a given network g and the MJW value
is in the core of our network-based transshipment game. In the rest of this paper, we say that a
network g is MJW-stable if the pair of g and the MJW value is in the core of the transshipment
game. The allocation rule based on the MJW value for a given network g is dened as follows:
MJWi (v; g) =
X
SNnfig

v(gjS[fig)  v(gjS)
	#S!(n #S   1)!
n!

for i 2 N: (10)
Similar to the Shapley value, the MJW value captures rmsmarginal contributions to the network
g, and preserves many desirable properties of the Shapley value (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). The
MJW value can be computed using the procedure similar to the Shapley value calculation, but it
is based on how the value changes as rm i is added to the network comprising rms in S; i.e.,
v(gjS[fig)   v(gjS). To illustrate how the MJW value di¤ers from the Shapley value, we consider
the following example of three rms from Soi´c (2006):
Example 2: Suppose that ri = 1 ($/unit); ui = 0 ($/unit); and tij = 0 ($/unit) for i; j 2 N =
f1; 2; 3g; and that rm 1 and rm 2 have residual demands E1 and E2, respectively, with E1  E2;
while rm 3 has the residual supply H3.
In this example, there are four possible scenarios: (1) H3  E1 + E2; (2) E2  H3 < E1 + E2; (3)
E1  H3 < E2; and (4) H3 < E1: For these scenarios, Table 1 presents the allocations based on the
Shapley value as well as the allocations based on the MJW value with the network g0 = f12; 23g
shown earlier in Figure 1(c). (See Appendix for the procedure of computing the MJW value.)
Table 1: Allocations based on the Shapley value and the MJW value
Shapley value (= MJW value in gf1;2;3g) MJW value in g0 = f12; 23g
Scenario Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
(1) H3  E1 + E2 E12 E22 E1+E22 E13 2E1+3E26 2E1+3E26
(2) E2  H3 < E1 + E2 E1+2H3 2E26 E2+2H3 2E16 E1+E2+2H36 H3 E23 2H3+E26 2H3+E26
(3) E1  H3 < E2 E16 3H3 2E16 E1+3H36 0 H32 H32
(4) H3 < E1 H36
H3
6
4H3
6 0
H3
2
H3
2
Observe from Table 1 that the allocations based on the MJW value in g0 are di¤erent from those
based on the Shapley value under all four scenarios. With the Shapley value, the allocation to rm
3 is strictly larger than the allocation to rm 1 or rm 2 in all four scenarios. This is because there
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exists only one supply node (rm 3) while there are two demand nodes (rm 1 and rm 2), and thus
the marginal contribution of the supply node is more signicant. However, under the MJW value,
rms 2 and 3 in the network g0 receive the same allocations in all four scenarios. The intuition is
that both rms play equally important roles in the transshipment network in the following sense:
without rm 2, no transshipment can occur because rm 1 and rm 3 are not connected to each
other, and without rm 3; there is no residual supply to transship. As shown in this example, the
MJW value takes into account the structure of a network as well as the residual amounts of rms.
In the following, we examine whether or not the pair (g; 'MJW (g)) is in the core: (1) when g
is the complete network in §4.3.1, and (2) when g is an incomplete network in §4.3.2.
4.3.1 Complete Network
In the complete network, any two rms can transship inventory directly between each other. Thus
one can expect that our network-based approach yields the same result as the coalition-based
approach. For Example 2, Soi´c (2006) has shown that the Shapley value is in the core in Scenario
1, whereas it is not in the core in Scenarios 2, 3, and 4. Thus the Shapley value is not always in
the core. Because the allocations under the MJW value in the complete network are the same as
those under the Shapley value, in general, the pair (gN ; 'MJW (gN )) is not always in the core of
our network-based transshipment game.
However, we can show that the pair (gN ; 'MJW (gN )) is in the core under a certain condition
on the residual supplies and demands. To establish this result, we use the notion of convexity in
cooperative game theory. Let the cooperative game (N; v) be convex if v(gjS00[fig)   v(gjS00) 
v(gjS0[fig)   v(gjS0) for any subsets S0 and S00 of N that satisfy S00  S0 and any rm i =2 S0.
Convexity refers to the property that, as the number of rms in the subnetwork the rm joins
increases, the marginal contribution of a rm (hence its allocation under the MJW value) weakly
increases. Thus, if (N; v) is convex, then no subnetworks have incentives to secede from the grand
coalition, and therefore the pair (gN ; 'MJW (gN )) is in the core of (N; v) (Jackson 2006). In our
transshipment game, suppose there exist only one demand node and multiple supply nodes. The
marginal contribution of the demand node is non-decreasing with the number of rms in any
subnetwork because there are more residual supplies within the subnetwork having more rms. For
the marginal contribution of a supply node to be non-decreasing with the number of rms in a
subnetwork, the subnetwork should have su¢ cient residual demands to generate additional prots
from the supply of the node. The next proposition bears this intuition.
Proposition 2 The pair (gN ; 'MJW (gN )) is in the core if there is one supply (resp., demand)
node i and its residual supply Hi (resp., demand Ei) is greater than or equal to the sum of all
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residual demands (resp., supplies), i.e. Hi 
P
j2Nnfig
Ej (resp., Ei 
P
j2Nnfig
Hj).
In Example 2, Scenario 1 satises the condition given in Proposition 2, whereas Scenarios 2, 3, and
4 do not satisfy this condition because there is only one supply node in the network but its residual
supply (H3) is not su¢ cient to satisfy all residual demands (E1 +E2). In those scenarios, a subset
of rms will form a subnetwork to earn more prot than the allocations they would receive in the
initial network gf1;2;3g under the MJW value. For example, in Scenario 3, rms 2 and 3 will form a
subnetwork to earn the total prot of H3 which is greater than the sum of their allocations under
the MJW value in gN , H3 E1=6. For the case where multiple demand nodes and multiple supply
nodes exist in gN , we show in the proof that the game is no longer convex.
By noting that the condition given in Proposition 2 is very restrictive, we can conclude that the
complete network is not MJW-stable in most scenarios. The primary reason for such instability is
that any two rms can transship inventory directly between each other in the complete network,
and rms often nd it more protable to secede from the complete network. In a regional blood
management system, for example, there is often a designated blood center through which other
blood banks transship their unused units of blood. One might temp to think that a complete
network, which allows direct transshipment between blood banks without going through a regional
blood center, may facilitate transshipment further because such direct shipment can potentially
save the costs of transportation and coordination. However, our result shows that such a complete
network may not be MJW-stable because a subset of blood centers may form their own subnetwork.
Because direct transshipment between every pair of rms is not possible in an incomplete
network, we may expect that incomplete networks could be more stable for transshipment among
independent rms. We examine this issue formally next.
4.3.2 Incomplete Networks
When a network g is incomplete, the contribution of each rm to transshipment depends on the
links associated with the rm as well as the amount of its residual supply or demand. As the
allocations based on the MJW value vary across di¤erent network structures, so do the stability
results. We rst consider examine the MJW-stability of various incomplete network structures that
appear in the literature: (1) a hub-spoke network, (2) a line network, and (3) a chain. Then we
demonstrate in (4) how a MJW-stable network with a general network structure can be derived
from another (known) MJW-stable network.
(1) Hub-spoke network To illustrate this network, let us rst consider Example 2 in the
incomplete network g00 = f13; 23g shown in Figure 4(a) in which rm 3 can be viewed as the hub.
Observe that even if the link 12 existed in this network, it would not change the prots from
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Figure 4: Examples of incomplete networks: (a)-(b) hub-spoke networks, (c)-(d) line networks, and
(e)-(f) chain networks.
transshipment among any subset of rms. This is because transportation costs are zero in this
example and both rms 1 and 2 are demand nodes. This suggests that the allocations under g00 are
the same as those under the complete network. Therefore, from the result of the complete network
in §4.3.1, the pair (g00; 'MJW (g00)) is in the core in Scenario 1, but not in Scenarios 2, 3, and 4.
For a general hub-spoke network gH with n rms as shown in Figure 4(b), the following propo-
sition presents a su¢ cient condition under which (gH ; 'MJW (gH)) is in the core.
Proposition 3 Consider a hub-spoke network gH = fi1i2; i1i3; :::; i1ing where i1 is the hub. The
pair (gH ; 'MJW (gH)) is in the core if Hi1 
P
j2Nnfi1g
Ej or Ei1 
P
j2Nnfi1g
Hj.
Di¤erent from Proposition 2 for the complete network, Proposition 3 shows that the number of
supply nodes or demand nodes in a hub-spoke network need not be one in order for (gH ; 'MJW (gH))
to be in the core. This di¤erence arises due to the special role of the hub in this network; i.e., any
subnetwork that does not include the hub generates no value. Recall from §1 that a regional blood
management system with one large blood center and multiple smaller blood banks forms a hub-
spoke network. Proposition 3 suggests that the regional blood center as the hub needs to have
su¢ cient residual supplies to satisfy all residual demands of blood banks in the spokes in order for
this network to be MJW-stable. This is because a subnetwork having the hub should receive at
least as large allocation in its initial network as the prot it can generate alone.
(2) Line network To illustrate this network, let us rst consider Example 2 in g0 = f12; 23g
shown in Figure 4(c). We refer to such a network as g0 in which all demand nodes are placed on
one side and all supply nodes are placed on the other side as a line.Table 1 (earlier) shows the
allocations based on the MJW value for g0. Apparently, subnetworks g0jf1;3g and g0jf1;2g have no
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incentives to secede from g0 because they cannot generate any prot from transshipment. Thus,
to determine whether the pair (g0; 'MJW (g0)) is in the core under each scenario, we only need to
examine whether a subnetwork g0jf2;3g has an incentive to secede from g0: If the subnetwork g0jf2;3g
is formed, then it can generate a prot of E2 in Scenarios 1 and 2, and a prot of H3 in Scenarios 3
and 4. On the other hand, when rms 2 and 3 stay in g0, Table 1 shows that the sum of allocations
to both rms is 2E1+3E23 ;
2H3+E2
3 ; H3; or H3 in Scenario 1, 2, 3, or 4, respectively. By comparing
these prots under each scenario, we nd that rms 2 and 3 do not earn more by forming the
subnetwork g0jf2;3g: Therefore, the pair (g0; 'MJW (g0)) is in the core under all four scenarios.
By comparing the stability result of g0 with those of the complete network gN and the hub-spoke
network g00, we can generate the following insight. In gN or g00, we have shown that some demand
node is excluded from transshipment (e.g., demand node 2 in Scenario 4) when the residual supply
is not su¢ cient to satisfy total residual demands in Scenarios 2, 3, and 4. In contrast, in g0, such a
demand node is valuable to the network by providing a path without which indirect transshipment
between the other nodes is not possible. For example, demand node 2 in g0 provides a path for
transshipment between demand node 1 and supply node 3. In this case, we say that the node
provides useful linksto the network.
Building on the intuition from three-rm networks above, we can establish a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for the pair (g; 'MJW (g)) to be in the core for any residual amounts. As shown
in Proposition 4, this condition requires that every node in the network g provides useful links to
the network, hence contributing to the connectivity of the entire network. Furthermore, the only
network structure that satises this condition is the line, denoted by gL, as shown in Figure 4(d).
Proposition 4 The only network structure, under which any two rms are connected and the
pair (g; 'MJW (g)) is in the core for any residual supply Hi, residual demand Ei; and (ri; tij ; ui)
(i; j 2 N), is the line gL = fi1i2; i2i3; :::; ikik+1; :::; in 1ing where Eij = 0 for j 2 f1; :::; kg and
Hij = 0 for j 2 fk + 1; :::; ng with 1  k  n  1:
(3) Chain For a network g having a structure other than the line, Proposition 4 suggests that
there always exist some amounts of residual supplies and demands with which some subnetwork
has an incentive to secede from the initial network g under the MJW value. Let us illustrate this
result using chain networks that were studied previously under a centralized system (e.g., Lien et al.
2011). For example, in the chain network g000  f12; 23; 34; 14g shown in Figure 4(e), transshipment
between rm 2 and rm 4 can occur either through rm 1 or rm 3. Thus, there are situations
in which rm 1 (resp., rm 3) does not provide useful links to the network and a subnetwork
g000jf2;3;4g (resp., g000jf1;2;4g) deviates from its initial network. As a result, additional conditions
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on the residual supplies and demands are required for this chain to be MJW-stable. Specically,
the following corollary shows such conditions when link ini1 is added to the line gL described in
Proposition 4 so that the network becomes the chain gC ; see Figure 4(f).
Corollary 1 Consider the chain network gC = fi1i2; i2i3; :::; ikik+1; :::; in 1in; ini1g where Eij = 0
for j 2 f1; :::; kg and Hij = 0 for j 2 fk + 1; :::; ng with 1  k  n   1: The pair (gC ; 'MJW (gC))
is in the core if
P
i2N
Hi =
P
i2N
Ei and 'MJWi (g
C)  v(gC)  v(gC jNnfig) 8i 2 N:
Corollary 1 shows that two conditions are required for the pair (gC ; 'MJW (gC)) to be in the core.
The rst condition requires that the total residual supplies equal the total residual demands. Sup-
pose the total residual supplies are greater than the total residual demands. Unlike the line, there
are two paths between any two rms in this chain. Thus, some supply nodes are excluded from
transshipment because neither their residual supplies nor their links are valuable to the network.
The second condition requires the allocation to each rm is lower than the rms marginal contri-
bution when the rm joins the subnetwork of (n  1) rms. This condition ensures that rms have
no incentives to cut one path for transshipment by excluding one rm.
(4) Other networks Although the line network presented in Proposition 4 guarantees the MJW
value to be in the core for any residual amounts, it is not very likely to observe such a network in
practice especially when a large number of rms exist. Then what other connected networks could
be stable under the MJW value? In the following proposition, we demonstrate how a MJW-stable
network with an arbitrary network structure can be derived from another MJW-stable network
(e.g., a line network).
Proposition 5 Suppose the pair (g; 'MJW (g)) is in the core. Then the pair (g+ ij; 'MJW (g+ ij))
is in the core if v(g + ijjS)  v(gjS) 
P
k2S
f'MJWk (g + ij)  'MJWk (g)g for all S  N:
We illustrate the result stated in Proposition 5 using an example shown in Figure 5. There are
four rms in the market: rms 1, 2 and 3 have residual demands E1 = E2 = E3 = 1 (unit), while
rm 4 has residual supply H4 = 3 (units). Suppose that ri = 1 ($/unit) and ui = 0 ($/unit)
for i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g; and tij = 0 ($/unit) for i; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g except that t34 = t43 = 0:9 ($/unit).
The line network g = f12; 23; 34g in Figure 5(a) is MJW-stable according to Proposition 4. By
adding link 24 to this network g, we construct another network g + 24 = f12; 23; 34; 24g shown in
Figure 5(b). In the following, we show that the initial network g and link 24 satisfy the condition
given in Proposition 5, so that the new network g + 24 is MJW-stable as well. To begin, consider
S = f1; 2; 4g: This subset contains both rms 2 and 4 that are connected through the new link
24. The initial network gjS generates no prots from transshipment because rms 1 and 2 are
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Figure 5: Examples of networks when four rms exist in the market: (a) line f12; 23; 34g; (b)
network f12; 23; 34; 24g obtained by adding link 24 to line f12; 23; 34g.
not connected to rm 4 without rm 3, whereas the new network g + 24jS generates a prot of
2 (units)  1 ($/unit) = $2; hence, v(g + 24jS)   v(gjS) = $2: On the other hand, we can show
that the total allocation to S under gjS is $23=120, while that under g + 24jS is $151=60; hence,P
k2f1;2;4g
f'MJWk (g + 24)   'MJWk (g)g = $279=120 (> v(g + 24jS)   v(gjS)): This means that link
24 increases the total allocation to S more than the additional prot it generates for S. This
happens because link 24 benets rms 1, 2, and 4 in subsets other than S, and the total allocation
to S reects the overall impact of link 24 across all subsets of f1; 2; 3; 4g. Similarly, we can show
that the condition given in Proposition 5 is satised for S = f2; 3; 4g or f2; 4g. For any subset S
that does not contain rm 2, rm 4 or both, link 24 does not generate any additional prot from
transshipment (i.e., v(g + 24jS)   v(gjS) = 0), nor does it decrease the total allocation to S (i.e.,P
k2S
f'MJWk (g + 24)   'MJWk (g)g  0); hence, satisfying the condition given in Proposition 5 as
well. Therefore, by Proposition 5, we can conclude that the network g + 24 shown in Figure 5(b)
is MJW-stable.
Let us summarize our main ndings in this subsection. Under the MJW value, the line network
is the only network structure that is MJW-stable for any residual amounts. For other networks,
MJW-stability requires certain conditions on residual amounts. Interestingly, the complete network
requires more stringent conditions than some incomplete networks. Therefore, the complete network
is not only more expensive in establishing all the links among rms, but can also be less stable in a
decentralized transshipment system. This result bears important implication because the previous
coalition-based approach examines only the complete network. Finally, note that this section has
examined the stability of an existing network g, assuming that the cost of building a link is a sunk
cost. In the next section, we examine the endogenous formation of networks, in which the cost of
building a link counts.
5 Endogenous Formation of Transshipment Networks
Suppose that a network g is formed endogenously through a partnership announcement subgame.
This subgame happens between the rst stage of inventory decisions and the second stage of trans-
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shipment in the model described in §4.1. After observing the realized demand, each rm simul-
taneously announces a set of rms to which it wants to set up a link. In making this decision,
a rm takes into account subsequent transshipment based on its network. When both rm i and
rm j have announced each other, a link ij is established in the network g, incurring a link cost
lij to rm i and lji to rm j. In the example of car dealers discussed in §1, dealers with residual
demand or supply contact other dealers, and transshipment can occur between two dealers who
are mutually interested in sharing their residuals. This process usually involves costs for labor and
administrative arrangements (i.e., link costs).
Our objective is to nd equilibrium network structures in this subgame. As for the equilibrium
concept for this subgame, we use pairwise Nash stability that renes Nash equilibrium (Jackson
and Wolinsky 1996). Given an allocation ' and link costs, a transshipment network g is pairwise
Nash stable if the following two conditions are satised:
'i(g)  'i(g   ij) + lij and 'j(g)  'j(g   ij) + lji for all ij 2 g; (11)
if 'i(g + ij) > 'i(g) + lij ; then 'j(g + ij) < 'j(g) + lji for all ij =2 g: (12)
A network is pairwise Nash stable if no rm wants to sever a link (ensured by (11)) and no two
rms want to add a link between them (ensured by (12)). For ease of exposition, we rst consider
a special case of zero link costs in §5.1, and then analyze a general case of arbitrary link costs in
§5.2. In both cases, we assume that the prot generated from transshipment is allocated according
to the MJW value, 'MJW (g).4
5.1 Zero Link Costs
In order to nd a pairwise Nash stable network, we choose the complete network as an initial
network (which is created when every rm announces all the other rms), and examine if some
rms have incentives to deviate. Alternatively, one can start from any network other than the
complete network, and analyze whether any rm has an incentive to sever a link or any two rms
have an incentive to establish a link between them.
To begin, we use Example 2 to illustrate some properties of a pairwise Nash stable network
under the MJW value. We compare the allocations to rms 1 and 3 in the complete network
gf1;2;3g (shown in the left column of Table 1) with those in the incomplete network g0 = f12; 23g
without link 13 (shown in the right column of Table 1). Table 1 reveals that the allocations to
both rms 1 and 3 in gf1;2;3g with link 13 are greater than or equal to those in g0 without link 13
4The MJW value has also been used in establishing pairwise Nash stability of networks in various other applications
because it not only has several desirable properties mentioned earlier but also guarantees the existence of a pairwise
Nash stable network (Jackson 2006).
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in all four scenarios. This is because link 13 increases the marginal contributions of rms 1 and
3 to the network. Similarly, we can show that the allocations to rms 2 and 3 with link 23 are
greater than or equal to those without link 23. When both links 13 and 23 exist as in gf1;2;3g and
g00 = f13; 23g, whether or not link 12 exists has no impact on the allocations because transshipment
between two demand nodes 1 and 2 does not add value to the network (when transportation cost
is zero). Therefore, both complete network gf1;2;3g and incomplete network g00 are pairwise Nash
stable under the MJW value.
We can generalize the above procedure developed for a three-rm network (n = 3) to a network
with any size (n  3). Dene the networks derived from the complete network as follows: A
network g is derived from the complete network gN if there exists a sequence of networks g1; :::; g
with g1 = gN and g = g such that gk+1 = gk   ij for each k 2 f1; :::;   1g; where link ij satises
'MJWi (gk+1)  'MJWi (gk)  lij or 'MJWj (gk+1)  'MJWj (gk)  lji: The existence of this sequence
of networks implies that, starting from the complete network, there exists a sequence of rms that
nd it weakly protable to sever their links. As illustrated above, multiple pairwise Nash stable
networks may exist (e.g., gf1;2;3g and g00 in Example 2). Using this procedure, we can obtain the
following proposition which describes a set of pairwise Nash stable networks for N = f1; 2; :::; ng.
Proposition 6 Suppose that a transshipment network is formed by n rms endogenously with no
link costs. Then the complete network gN is always pairwise Nash stable under the allocation based
on the MJW value. Furthermore, any pairwise Nash stable network g derived from the complete
network gN contains any link ij with Y g
N jS
ij > 0 for some S  N; where Y g
N jS is the unique optimal
transshipment pattern of the transshipment problem within S given in (6)-(9).
Proposition 6 states that rms have no incentives to sever any link ij which is useful for transship-
ment within some S  N (i.e., Y gN jSij > 0). For example, in our discussion of Example 2 above,
link 13 is useful for transshipment within S = f1; 3g; and link 23 is useful within S = f2; 3g; con-
sequently, g00 = f13; 23g is pairwise Nash stable under the MJW value. Furthermore, Proposition
6 implies that there is over-connection in the pairwise Nash stable networks under the MJW value
relative to an optimal transshipment pattern of the centralized transshipment problem. Firms have
no incentives to sever any link ij which is useful for some S (i.e., Y g
N jS
ij > 0) even if that link is
not utilized in the optimal transshipment pattern of the centralized transshipment problem for N
(i.e., Y g
N
ij = 0 and Y
gN
ji = 0). For example, one optimal transshipment pattern of the centralized
transshipment problem in Example 2 under Scenario 1 is that Y32 = E1 + E2 and Y21 = E1; i.e.,
rm 3 transships its residual supply of E1 + E2 ( H3) to rm 2; and then rm 2 transships the
supply of E1 to rm 1 after satisfying its residual demand E2: In this transshipment pattern, link
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Figure 6: Pairwise Nash stable networks under the MJW value in Example 3.
13 is not utilized. However, the complete network gf1;2;3g; which is pairwise Nash stable under the
MJW value, includes link 13. From a bargaining perspective, rms 1 and 3 have stronger bargaining
powers with link 13 when negotiating how to allocate prots from transshipment with rm 2: This
is because rms 1 and 3 can still transship E1 without rm 2; in other words, they have a better
outside option with link 13. In the example of car dealers above, link costs may be negligible when
a web-based inventory system as well as an industry protocol for transshipment is established well.
In this case, a dealer may attempt to build connections with many other dealers so as to increase
his bargaining power against others even though he may need only few partners for transshipment
eventually. Because there is no cost to improve ones bargaining power in this case, the complete
network is always pairwise Nash stable under the MJW value.
5.2 Positive Link Costs
Suppose that link cost lij or lji is positive for at least one pair of rms i and j. Following the
procedure developed in §5.1, we can identify a set of pairwise Nash stable networks. For example,
Figure 6 shows all pairwise Nash stable networks in the following example under the MJW value:
Example 3: Suppose that ri = 1 ($/unit); ui = 0 ($/unit); tij = 0 ($/unit) 8i; j 2 N; and that
E1 = 5 (units); E2 = 3 (units); H3 = 5 (units), H4 = 3 (units) and lij = lji = 1 ($/link) 8ij 2 g.
As shown in Figure 6, unlike the case with zero link costs, the complete network is not always
pairwise Nash stable under the MJW value because rms face trade-o¤s between better network
positions and additional link costs.
For the case with zero link costs, Proposition 6 in §5.1 has shown that rms tend to be over-
connected in pairwise Nash stable networks under the MJW value. Since a positive link cost dis-
courages rms from establishing unnecessary links, one may wonder if rms are still over-connected
in this case. To examine this question, we introduce the notion of e¢ ciency. We say that a network
g is e¢ cient if it maximizes the prot from transshipment less the total link cost, v(g) P
ij2g
(lij+lji):
Proposition 7 below shows that pairwise Nash stable networks are not, in general, e¢ cient in trans-
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shipment under the MJW value. This demonstrates the tension between the stability and e¢ ciency
of a network.5
Proposition 7 Suppose that there exist some S  N and a link ij with lij > 0 or lji > 0 such
that: (i) v(gN jS) has a unique optimal transshipment pattern Y gN jS with Y g
N jS
ij > 0; and (ii) v(g
N )
has a unique optimal transshipment pattern Y g
N
with Y g
N
ij = 0 and Y
gN
ji = 0. Then there exists
l > 0 such that, if lij < l and lji < l 8ij 2 g, every pairwise Nash stable network g derived from the
complete network gN is not e¢ cient under the allocation based on the MJW value because there is
a subnetwork g of g which satises v(g)  P
ij2g
(lij + lji) < v(g
)  P
ij2g
(lij + lji).
Proposition 7 suggests that a pairwise Nash stable transshipment network under the MJW value
is still over-connected with positive link costs. The ine¢ ciency of a pairwise Nash stable network
arises because individual rms try to maximize their own allocations instead of maximizing the
aggregate prot of the entire network. The condition under which a stable network is ine¢ cient
requires the existence of a link with a positive link cost, which is utilized for transshipment within
at least one subset S  N (i.e., Y gN jSij > 0); but is not utilized in the optimal transshipment pattern
of the centralized problem among all rms (i.e., Y g
N
ij = 0 and Y
gN
ji = 0): In the example of a car
dealer network, this result means that, even if the cost of establishing an connection is not negligible,
dealers still build connections with a larger number of other dealers than necessary so as to improve
their positions. Such excess connections hurt the e¢ ciency of a decentralized transshipment system.
To improve the e¢ ciency, a third-party organization such as a local automobile dealers association
or an auto manufacturer may intervene a decentralized dealer network to coordinate the incentives
of independent dealers.
6 Inventory Decisions
In this section, we analyze rms inventory decisions in the rst stage of the game. Following
Anupindi et al. (2001) and Granot and Soi´c (2003), we focus our analysis on whether a certain
allocation rule used in the second transshipment stage would lead to inventory decisions in the rst
stage which are optimal for the centralized system (i.e., achieve the rst-best). We will rst discuss
the case when a network g is given as in §4, and then discuss the case when a network g is formed
endogenously as in §5.
5This tension is rst discovered by Jackson (2006) in the setting where any link in the network generates a positive
value; i.e., v(fijg) > 0 for any i; j 2 N . In that case, the complete network is the only pairwise Nash stable network
with a small link cost. Our model is di¤erent in that v(fijg) = 0 is possible when Ei = Ej = 0 or Hi = Hj = 0 for
any i; j 2 N , so that incomplete networks can also be pairwise Nash stable.
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Given a network g, each rm determines its inventory level independently by considering un-
certain demands and ex-post transshipment of its residual demand or supply with other rms in
the network g. The ex-post total prot of rm i can be expressed as follows: given the network g,
demand prole D, its own inventory level Xi; and a vector of other rmsinventory levels X i,
i(g;Xi; X i; D) = [riminfXi;Dig+ uiHi   ciXi] + 'i(g;Xi; X i; D);
where the rst term in the bracket represents the prot from satisfying its local demand Di; and
the second term 'i represents the allocation it receives from subsequent transshipment. A Nash
equilibrium inventory prole XNE satises: XNEi (g) = argmax
Xi
ED[i(g;Xi; X
NE
 i ; D)] for all i.
In the coalition-based transshipment game, Anupindi et al. (2001) and Granot and Soi´c (2003)
have shown that the dual price allocation and the Shapley value do not always lead to the rst-best
inventory levels, respectively. Because coalitions are special cases of networks, the same results
apply to our network-based transshipment game, so that our dual price allocation 'DP (g) and the
MJW value 'MJW (g) do not lead to the rst-best inventory levels.
Following the lead of Anupindi et al. (2001) and Granot and Soi´c (2003), however, we can
construct a new allocation 'FB(g) that leads to the rst-best inventory levels. While 'DP (g) and
'MJW (g) determine allocations of rms based on the ex-post prot generated from the second
transshipment stage, 'FB(g) uses the ex-post prot generated from both stages. Let (g;X;D)
denote the sum of ex-post prots of all rms from both stages. We can express  as follows:
(g;X;D) =
X
i2N
[riminfXi;Dig+ uiHi   ciXi] + CTP (g;X;D): (13)
Corollary 2 Let i 2 (0; 1) such that
P
i2N
i = 1: When a network g is given, the allocation dened
by 'FBi (g) = i(g;X;D)   [riminfXi;Dig + uiHi   ciXi] for i 2 N induces the inventory levels
in a rst-best solution to be a Nash equilibrium prole XNE.
The intuition from Corollary 2 is straightforward as follows. The allocation 'FB(g) gives each rm
i a xed fraction i of the total prot (g;X;D) of all rms in both stages less the rms own
prot from the rst stage of the game. Then the total prot of a rm from both stages is simply
a xed fraction i of the total prot (g;X;D) generated by all rms in the network g: Since i
is independent of a rms inventory decision, the rm chooses the inventory level to maximize the
total prot (g;X;D) under this allocation.
When a network g is formed endogenously as in §5, a rm needs to consider the strategic
formation of transshipment networks in determining its optimal inventory level, in addition to
uncertain demands and ex-post transshipment based on the network g. The total prot (g;X;D)
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in this case can be written as
(g;X;D) =
X
i2N
[riminfXi;Dig+ uiHi   ciXi  
X
j2Bi(g)
lij ] + CTP (g;X;D): (14)
Compared with (13), (g;X;D) in (14) contains the total link cost
P
i2N
P
j2Bi(g)
lij . Similar to the
allocation presented in Corollary 2, we can construct an allocation 'FB(g) that induces rms to
choose their rst-best inventory levels. Furthermore, under 'FB(g), there always exists a pairwise
Nash stable network that is also e¢ cient. Corollary 3 summarizes the results.
Corollary 3 Let i 2 (0; 1) such that
P
i2N
i = 1: When a network g is formed endogenously,
there exists an e¢ cient network g that is pairwise Nash stable under the allocation dened by
'FBi (g) = i(g;X;D)+
P
j2Bi(g)
lij  [riminfXi;Dig+uiHi ciXi] for i 2 N: Furthermore, 'FBi (g)
induces the inventory levels in a rst-best solution to be a Nash equilibrium prole XNE.
Corollary 3 shows that, unlike the MJW value, there is no tension between stability and e¢ ciency
under 'FBi (g): However, '
FB
i (g) may violate some desired properties of the MJW value such as
symmetry when i is not chosen properly.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies a cooperative game of inventory transshipment among multiple rms. As rms
try to maximize their own prots, the value generated through transshipment needs to be allocated
properly to coordinate the incentives of rms to participate in transshipment. To analyze this
problem, the extant literature uses the concept of coalitions in cooperative game theory, while
we use networks of rms as the primitive. Our network-based approach explicitly models the
actual paths over which inventories are transshipped, and provides a richer form of representing
relationships among rms than the previous coalition-based approach. This enables us to analyze
partial cooperation structures based on networks in which partnership may exist between some but
not among all rms. Our results provide the following managerial insights.
First, if the primary objective of a decentralized transshipment network is to make all rms
participate in transshipment, then the dual price allocation can achieve this goal by providing
rms with proper incentives. This might be the case for a non-prot association of local blood
banks, since the transshipment of unused units of blood can potentially save the lives of people
who urgently need those units. The dual price allocation we construct in the network setting takes
into account the positions of rms in their networks as well as the amounts of their residual supplies
or demands. By doing so, this allocation prevents a subset of rms from forming their subnetwork,
and thus maximizes the value of pooling all residuals.
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Second, compared to the dual price allocation, the MJW value provides a more intuitive way of
allocating prots from transshipment to individual rms by considering their marginal contributions
to a network. However, one should be cautious in implementing this allocation rule because it may
induce some rms to form their own subnetwork, hurting the total value that can be generated
from transshipment of all residuals. For example, in a regional blood management system, there is
often a designated blood center through which other blood banks transship their unused units of
blood. If the MJW value is implemented in this hub-spoke network, then the regional blood center
as the hub needs to have su¢ cient residual supplies to satisfy all residual demands of blood banks
in the spokes in order for this transshipment system to be stable.
Third, when the prots from transshipment are allocated according to the MJW value, rms
incentives to participate in transshipment depend crucially on how they are connected in a network.
For example, one might temp to think that the complete network, which allows direct transshipment
between blood banks without going through a regional blood center, may facilitate transshipment
further because direct shipments can potentially save the costs of transportation and coordination.
However, our result shows that such a transshipment system can be less stable than a hub-spoke
network having a regional blood center as the hub. Thus, rms should consider building an incom-
plete network for their transshipment network because it is not only cheaper to institute than the
complete network, but can also lead to a more stable cooperative transshipment system.
Fourth, an e¢ cient network in a centralized system may not be stable in a decentralized system
of independent rms. For example, a chain of retail stores or warehouses is known to be e¢ cient
in a centralized system by allowing all members to share their residual supplies and demands with
a small number of links (e.g., Gerchak and Kalikhman 2011, Lien et al. 2011). However, our
result shows that a chain of independent rms can incentivize rms to participate in transshipment
only under some restrictive conditions. Thus, managers should be careful in applying the insights
obtained for a centralized system to a decentralized system.
Finally, when rms are able to establish connections with each other, they tend to build con-
nections with a large number of other rms even though they may need only few partners for actual
transshipments. Such over-connection in a network exists because rms try to increase their bar-
gaining powers against other rms, leading to an ine¢ cient transshipment system. For example,
when car dealers search for their partners to share their residual demand or supply, they may at-
tempt to negotiate with many other dealers so as to increase their bargaining positions. This may
happen even when the cost of search and negotiation is not negligible. To improve the e¢ ciency of
a transshipment network, a third-party organization such as a local automobile dealers association
or an auto manufacturer may intervene a decentralized transshipment system to coordinate the
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incentives of independent rms.
There are several future research avenues. In our model of endogenous network formation, rms
announce their partners simultaneously. One may consider sequential announcements. Modeling
repeated interactions and negotiations between rms is an interesting dimension to investigate.
In addition to the concept of pairwise Nash stability we used in this paper, there also exist other
stability concepts such as stochastic or farsighted stability. Such concepts can be applied to analyze
the inventory transshipment problem in a richer setting. Besides the inventory transshipment
networks studied in this paper, one can potentially apply the theory of economic and social networks
to analyze the stability and formation of networks in various other operational problems. For
example, in a supply chain with disruption risks, over-connection in a network might be benecial
for rms in terms of risk-hedging. This paper may serve as the rst step to many such analyses.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For a given network g, the value function v given in (6)-(9) is obtained
by solving a linear program. So, the cooperative transshipment game given a network g can be
viewed as the linear production game considered by Owen (1975). Moreover, this game can be
modeled as the market game of Shapley and Shubik (1975) in which players trade products with
each other. Then the result follows from Shapley and Shubik (1975) who have shown that the dual
price allocation is in the core of a market game. Q.E.D.
Remark: Essentially, this proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Anupindi et al. (2001)
because the linearity in (6)-(9) is preserved in our network setting.
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider the case when only one supply node exists in the network. The
proof for the case when only one demand node exists follows the same procedure. To prove that
the pair (gN ; 'MJW (gN )) is in the core of (N; v); it su¢ ces to show that (N; v) is convex (Jackson
2006). We prove that (N; v) is convex by showing that v(gjS00[fig)  v(gjS00)  v(gjS0[fig)  v(gjS0)
for any subsets S0 and S00 of N that satisfy S00  S0 and any node i =2 S0 in each of the following
two cases: (Case 1) node i is the supply node, and (Case 2) node i is not the supply node.
(Case 1): If i is the supply node, then neither S0 nor S00 contains any supply nodes, so v(gN jS00) =
v(gN jS0) = 0: Thus, if v(gN jS0[fig)  v(gN jS00[fig); then v(gN jS0[fig)   v(gN jS0)  v(gN jS00[fig)  
v(gN jS00). To prove that v(gN jS0[fig)  v(gN jS00[fig), we dene f(gjS ; Y ) 
P
i2S
fai(
P
j2Bi(gjS)
Yji  P
j2Bi(gjS)
Yij) 
P
j2Bi(gjS)
Yij(tij+ui uj)g; which is the objective function of the program given in (6).
Then, v(gN jS0[fig) = f(gN jS0[fig; Y g
N jS0[fig)  f(gN jS0[fig; Y g
N jS00[fig) = f(gN jS00[fig; Y g
N jS00[fig) =
v(gN jS00[fig) because:
- By the denition of optimal transshipment patterns; v(gN jS0[fig) = f(gN jS0[fig; Y g
N jS0[fig) and
v(gN jS00[fig) = f(gN jS00[fig; Y g
N jS00[fig);
- Since S00  S0, the transshipment pattern Y gN jS00[fig is feasible to the program (6)-(9) with g = gN
and S = S0 [ fig, so that f(gN jS0[fig; Y g
N jS00[fig) = f(gN jS00[fig; Y g
N jS00[fig);
- Because Y g
N jS0[fig is the optimal transshipment pattern among all the feasible transshipment
patterns given the network gN jS0[fig, f(gN jS0[fig; Y g
N jS0[fig)  f(gN jS0[fig; Y g
N jS00[fig).
(Case 2): Suppose j (6= i) is the supply node. There are three possibilities:
(a) If j =2 S0 (hence j =2 S00), then v(gN jS00[fig) = v(gN jS00) = v(gN jS0[fig) = v(gN jS0) = 0 because
S0 [ fig, S0, S00 [ fig, and S00 have no supply nodes.
(b) If j 2 S0 and j =2 S00, then v(gN jS0[fig)   v(gN jS0)  0 = v(gN jS00[fig)   v(gN jS00), where the
inequality is due to the fact that S0[fig and S0 include the supply node j and P
k2S0[fig
Ek 
P
k2S0
Ek,
and the equality is because S00 [ fig and S00 have no supply nodes.
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(c) If j 2 S00 (hence j 2 S0), v(gN jS0[fig)  v(gN jS0) = v(gN jS00[fig)  v(gN jS00) = (ri uj   tminji )Ei;
where tminji is the minimum of the transportation costs from j to i among all possible paths. The
equations hold because S0[fig, S0, S00[fig, and S00 include the supply node j with Hj 
P
k2Nnfjg
Ek.
Q.E.D.
Remark: Suppose direct shipment incurs a minimum transportation cost among all paths between
every pair of two rms and transshipment is always protable (i.e., r u t > 0 for all ;  2 N).
Then, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the convexity to hold is that there is only one supply
(resp., demand) node j with Hj 
P
k2Nnfjg
Ek (resp., Ej 
P
k2Nnfjg
Hk). Su¢ ciency is shown in the
proof of Proposition 2. In the following, we show the necessity in two steps.
First, we show that the convexity does not hold when multiple demand nodes and multiple
supply nodes exist in the complete network. We prove this by contradiction. Consider the complete
network gN with multiple demand nodes and multiple supply nodes. Without loss of generality,
suppose E1; E2; H3; and H4 are all positive. If the convexity holds, then v(gN jf1;2;3g[f4g)  
v(gN jf1;2;3g)  v(gN jf1;2g[f4g) v(gN jf1;2g): This indicates that E1+E2  H3+H4 because otherwise
there are more residual demands available within f1; 2g than within f1; 2; 3g (i.e., E1 + E2 >
E1 + E2  H3) and v(gN jf1;2;3g[f4g)  v(gN jf1;2;3g) < v(gN jf1;2g[f4g)  v(gN jf1;2g): Similarly, since
v(gN jf2;3;4g[f1g)  v(gN jf2;3;4g)  v(gN jf3;4g[f1g)  v(gN jf3;4g), E1+E2  H3+H4: To satisfy these
two inequalities simultaneously, E1 +E2 = H3 +H4. Further, since v(gN jf2;3g[f4g)  v(gN jf2;3g) 
v(gN jf2g[f4g)   v(gN jf2g), E2  H3 + H4: Because E2 = H3 + H4   E1  H3 + H4 and E1  0;
E1 = 0; which contradicts our premise that E1 > 0.
Second, we show that, given there exists only one supply node j, the convexity does not hold
when Hj <
P
k2Nnfjg
Ek. (The case when only one demand node exists follows the same procedure,
and hence omitted.) We prove this by nding S0 and S00 ( S0) that do not satisfy v(gjS00[fig)  
v(gjS00)  v(gjS0[fig)   v(gjS0). Since Hj <
P
k2Nnfjg
Ek; there exist S0 and S00 such that Hj  P
k2S0
Ek < Ei and Hj  
P
k2S00
Ek > 0 (S00 can be the empty set) for i =2 S0. Then, v(gN jS0[fig)  
v(gN jS0) = (ri uj tji)max(Hj 
P
k2S0
Ek; 0) and v(gN jS00[fig) v(gN jS00) = (ri uj tji)min(Hj P
k2S00
Ek; Ei) because direct shipment incurs a minimum transportation cost and transshipment is
always protable. Therefore, v(gN jS0[fig)   v(gN jS0) < v(gN jS00[fig)   v(gN jS00) because Hj  P
k2S0
Ek < Hj  
P
k2S00
Ek; Hj  
P
k2S0
Ek < Ei; Hj  
P
k2S00
Ek > 0 and Ei > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider the case when the hub is a supply node. (The proof for the case
when the hub is a demand node follows the same procedure.) Similar to the proof of Proposition 2,
we prove that the pair (gH ; 'MJW (gH)) is in the core by showing that v(gH jS00[fig)  v(gH jS00) 
v(gH jS0[fig) v(gH jS0) for any subsets S0 and S00 of N that satisfy S00  S0; and for any node i =2 S0.
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Figure 7: Line gL and its subnetwork gLjfik e+1;:::;ik+hg:
We consider the following three cases: (Case 1) node i is the hub, (Case 2) node i is a supply node
but not the hub, and (Case 3) node i is a demand node.
(Case 1): The proof is similar to that in (Case 1) of Proposition 2 because, given i =2 S0; we have
Bk(g
H jS0) = ; 8k 2 S0 and Bk(gH jS00) = ; 8k 2 S00 so that v(gN jS00) = v(gN jS0) = 0.
(Case 2): Suppose j (6= i) is the hub. There are three possibilities:
(a) If j =2 S0 (hence j =2 S00), then v(gH jS00[fig) = v(gH jS00) = v(gH jS0[fig) = v(gH jS0) = 0 because
Bk(g
H jS0[fig) = ; 8k 2 S0 [ fig and Bk(gH jS00[fig) = ; 8k 2 S00 [ fig without the hub.
(b) If j 2 S0 and j =2 S00, then v(gH jS0[fig)   v(gH jS0)  0 = v(gH jS00[fig) = v(gH jS00) where the
inequality is due to the fact that S0[fig and S0 include the hub, and the equality is because S00[fig
and S00 do not include the hub.
(c) If j 2 S00 (hence j 2 S0), v(gN jS0[fig)   v(gN jS0) = v(gN jS00[fig)   v(gN jS00) = 0 because Hi
generates zero value given Hj 
P
k2Nnfjg
Ek:
(Case 3): The proof is similar to the proof of (Case 2) of Proposition 2, in which the hub acts as
the supply node j which ships inventory to node i. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: For su¢ ciency, we show that the pair (gL; 'MJW (gL)) is always in the
core, so any subnetwork of gL has no incentive to secede from gL under the MJW value. Clearly,
any subnetwork with no supply nodes or no demand nodes has no incentive to secede because
they generate no prot. Thus, in the rest of the proof, we consider subnetworks that contain at
least one supply node and one demand node. Without loss of generality, consider the subnetwork
gLjfik e+1;:::;ik+hg of the line gL shown in Figure 7. Note that gL contains k rms with Eij = 0 for
j = 1; 2; :::; k, and (n   k) rms with Hij = 0 for j = k + 1; k + 2; :::; n, while gLjfik e+1;:::;ik+hg
contains e ( k) rms with Eij = 0 for j = k   e+ 1; :::; k; and h ( n  k) rms with Hij = 0 for
j = k + 1; :::; k + h; where e = 1; 2; :::; k; and h = 1; 2; :::; n  k:
To prove that gLjfik e+1;:::;ik+hg has no incentive to secede from gL; we show that the allocations
to the rms in gLjfik e+1;:::;ik+hg are non-decreasing when an outside rm is added to this subnet-
work. Consider adding rm ik e with no residual demand to this subnetwork. (The proof for
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adding a rm with no residual supply is similar, and hence omitted.) If Hik e = 0; the allocations
are unchanged, so we focus on the case when Hik e > 0. First, consider the allocations to rm
ij for j = k   e + 1; :::; k. We shall show that, when ik e is added, the marginal contributions of
rm ij are non-decreasing in all the orderings of the rms in gLjfik e;ik e+1;:::;ik+hg. Without loss
of generality, consider two orderings before and after rm ik e is added: (1) ordering fi01; :::; i
0
e+hg,
and (2) ordering fi001 ; :::; i00; :::; i
00
e+h+1g with i
00
 = ik e; i
00
j = i
0
j for j < ; and i
00
j = i
0
j 1 for j >
; i.e.,  ( e + h + 1) is the position of rm ik e in the second ordering and the two orderings
have the same sequence of rms except ik e. Suppose the positions of rm ij ; whose allocations
are under consideration, in the two orderings are 1 and 2; respectively. We can dene the sets of
rms before rm ij in the two orderings, respectively, S
0
= fi01; :::; i
0
1 1g and S
00
= fi001 ; :::; i
00
2 1g.
If ik e =2 S00 ; then we have S0 = S00 ; so v(gLjS0[fijg)   v(gLjS0) = v(gLjS00[fijg)   v(gLjS00): If
ik e 2 S00 ; it can be shown that v(gLjS0) = v(gLjS00) because rm ik e is not connected to any
demand node without ij : Furthermore, we have v(gLjS00[fijg)  v(gLjS0[fijg) because more resid-
ual supplies are available within the subnetwork after rm ik e is added. Therefore, we obtain
v(gLjS00[fijg)  v(gLjS00)  v(gLjS0[fijg)  v(gLjS0): Second, it can be shown in a similar way that,
when ik e is added, the allocations to ij for j = k + 1; :::; k + h are non-decreasing as well. As a
result, no subnetwork in gL has an incentive to secede.
For necessity, we show that if the pair (g; 'MJW (g)) is in the core for any residual amounts
(and thus for any numbers of supply and demand nodes), network g must be the line gL. We
conduct the proof by showing the following two properties must hold for the network g such that
the pair (g; 'MJW (g)) is in the core for any residual amounts: (Property 1) every demand (resp.,
supply) node has at most one link to supply (resp., demand) nodes, and (Property 2) every rm
has at most two links. Then, the only network structure that satises these two properties for any
residual amounts and any numbers of supply and demand nodes is the line.
First, we show that if g does not satisfy Property 1, then (g; 'MJW (g)) is not always in the core
for any residual amounts. For this proof, it su¢ ces to nd a network g having a demand node with
more than one link to supply nodes, and show that a subnetwork of g has an incentive to secede
from g for certain quantities of residual supplies and demands. Consider g that contains rm 1
with E1 = 1 and B1(g) > 1, and (n  1) rms with residual supplies. Let rm 2 denote a rm with
the minimum value of ui + ti1 among all i 2 B1(g), and assume H2 = 1: The prot generated by
transshipment is v(g) = r1 u2  t21: If there exists any other rm i 2 B1(g) such that Hi > 0 and
r1 ui  ti1 > 0; it receives a strictly positive allocation based on the MJW value according to (10)
because rm i makes a positive marginal contribution to g. Then the sum of allocations to rms 1
and 2 is strictly less than r1   u2   t21 because the presence of another supply node i reduces the
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Figure 8: Subnetworks that have incentives to secede from the network g.
marginal contribution of rm 2. On the other hand, if rms 1 and 2 secede, they can generate a
prot of r1   u2   t21 which is larger than the allocations they receive in the initial network g.
Second, similarly to Property 1, we show that if g does not satisfy Property 2, then (g; 'MJW (g))
is not always in the core for any residual amounts. As in the proof for Property 1, consider rm
1 with E1 = 1 and (n   1) rms with residual supplies. Given rm 1 is only linked to rm 2 to
prevent any subnetwork from seceding from g; we show that there exists at most one rm i with
Hi > 0 linked to rm 2; otherwise, there exists a subnetwork which has an incentive to secede.
As shown in Figure 8(a), denote the rm i 2 B2(g) in the network g with the minimum value
of ui + ti2 as rm 3. Set H2 = 0:5 and H3 = 0:5. Then the prot generated by transshipment
is v(g) = r1   0:5u2   t21   0:5u3   0:5t32: If there exists any other rm i 2 B2(g) such that
Hi > 0 and r1   ui   ti2   t21 > 0; it receives strictly positive allocation based on the MJW value,
e.g. rm 4. On the other hand, if rms 1; 2 and 3 secede, they can still generate a prot of
r1   0:5u2   t21   0:5u3   0:5t32 which is greater than the allocations they receive in the initial
network g. Next, we consider the subnetwork in Figure 8(b) to show that, other than rm 2; there
exists at most one rm i with Hi > 0 which is linked to rm 3. We denote rm 4 as the rm
with the minimum value of ui + ti3 for i 2 B3(g) in the network g. Set H2 = 0:5, H3 = 0:25 and
H4 = 0:25. By the same argument as above, we know rms 1; 2; 3 and 4 have an incentive to secede
if rm 5 is also linked to rm 3. Repeating the same procedure for rms 4; :::; n, we can show that
network g must be a line if the pair (g; 'MJW (g)) is always in the core. Q.E.D.
Remark: The chain does not satisfy Property 1 while it satises Property 2, because, in the case
with only one demand (resp., supply) node, the demand (resp., supply) node is linked to two supply
(resp., demand) nodes in the chain.
Proof of Corollary 1: First, since 'MJWi (g
C)  v(gC)   v(gC jNnfig) 8i 2 N; we know that any
subnetworks with n 1 rms have no incentive to secede from gC . Next, similar to the proof of the
su¢ ciency of Proposition 4, we consider a subnetwork of gC with less than n 1 rms and show that
the allocations to the rms in this subnetwork are non-decreasing when an outside rm is added.
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Figure 9: Chain gC and its subnetwork gC jfi1;:::;ik+h1 ;in h2+1;:::;ing:
For the subnetworks in which all the demand nodes are on one side and all the supply nodes are on
the other side, the proof is the same as that for the line. Without loss of generality, we consider the
subnetwork gC jfi1;:::;ik+h1 ;in h2+1;:::;ing of the chain gC shown in Figure 9. Note that gC contains k
rms with Eij = 0 for j = 1; 2; :::; k, and (n  k) rms with Hij = 0 for j = k+1; k+2; :::; n, while
gC jfi1;:::;ik+h1 ;in h2+1;:::;ing contains k rms with Eij = 0 for j = 1; 2; :::; k; and h1+h2 ( n  k  2)
rms with Hij = 0 for j = k+1; :::; k+h1 and j = n h2+1; :::; n where h1+h2 = 2; 3; :::; n k 2:
Consider adding rm in h2 to this subnetwork. If Ein h2 = 0; the allocations are unchanged, so
we focus on the case when Ein h2 > 0. Adding residual demands does not reduce the marginal values
of residual supplies and in h2 is not connected to any supply node without ij for j = n h2+1; :::; n:
Thus, it can be shown in the same way as the proof of Proposition 4 that the allocations to rm ij for
j = 1; :::; k and j = n h2+1; :::; n are non-decreasing when in h2 is added. In the rest of this proof,
we show that the marginal contributions of rm ij for j = k + 1; :::; k + h1 are also non-decreasing
in all the orderings of the rms in gC jfi1;:::;ik+h1 ;in h2+1;:::;ing. Without loss of generality, consider
two orderings before and after rm in h2 is added with the sequence of other rms being the same:
(1) ordering fi01; :::; i
0
k+h1+h2
g, and (2) ordering fi001 ; :::; i00; :::; i
00
k+h1+h2+1
g with i00 = in h2 ; i
00
j = i
0
j
for j < ; and i
00
j = i
0
j 1 for j > . Suppose the positions of rm ij ; whose allocations are under
consideration, in the two orderings are 1 and 2; respectively:We can dene the sets of rms before
rm ij in the two orderings, respectively, S
0
= fi01; :::; i
0
1 1g and S
00
= fi001 ; :::; i
00
2 1g. If in h2 =2 S
00
;
then we have S
0
= S
00
; so v(gC jS0[fijg)   v(gC jS0) = v(gC jS00[fijg)   v(gC jS00): If in h2 2 S00 and
there exists im =2 S00 for m = 1; :::; k; then v(gC jS0[fijg)   v(gC jS0) = v(gC jAij[fijg)   v(gC jAij ) =
v(gC jS00[fijg)   v(gC jS00) where Aij is the set of rms that are directly or indirectly connected
to ij in gC jS0[fijg: The rst equality holds because the marginal value of ij depends only on the
rms it is connected to. The second equality holds because ij and in h2 are not connected in
gC jS00[fijg: Finally, if in h2 2 S
00
and im 2 S00 8 m = 1; :::; k; then v(gC jS00[fijg)   v(gC jS00) =
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v(gC jS0[fijg)   v(gC jS0) because
P
i2N
Hi =
P
i2N
Ei: Therefore, no subnetwork of gC has an incentive
to secede from gC . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, we can show that v(g + ijjS)  
v(gjS)  0 for all S  N:When v(g+ijjS) v(gjS) = 0 for all S  N; 'MJWk (g+ij) 'MJWk (g) = 0
for all k 2 N due to (10). Therefore, P
k2S
'MJWk (g+ij) =
P
k2S
'MJWk (g)  v(gjS) = v(g+ijjS); where
the inequality holds because the pair (g; 'MJW (g)) is in the core. When v(g + ijjS)   v(gjS) >
0,
P
k2S
'MJWk (g + ij)   v(g + ijjS) 
P
k2S
'MJWk (g)   v(gjS)  0 because v(g + ijjS)   v(gjS) P
k2S
f'MJWk (g + ij)  'MJWk (g)g: Therefore, the pair (g + ij; 'MJW (g + ij)) is in the core. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: First, we prove that the complete network is pairwise Nash stable
under the MJW value by showing that any rms i and j have no incentives to sever link ij in the
complete network. Consider ordering fi1; i2; :::; i; :::; ing used to calculate the MJW value with
i = i and rm j can be anywhere in this ordering. Dene set S0 = fi1; i2; :::; i 1g, i.e. the
set of rms before rm i in this ordering. Then we have v(gN jS0)   v(gN   ijjS0) = 0 because
S0 does not contain rm i: Also, v(gN jS0[fig)   v(gN   ijjS0[fig)  0 because gN jS0[fig has one
more link than gN   ijjS0[fig. With di¤erent orderings, S0 can be any subset of Nnfig. Therefore,
from the denition of the MJW value given in (10), we obtain 'MJWi (g
N )   'MJWi (gN   ij) =P
S0Nnfig

v(gN jS0[fig)  v(gN   ijjS0[fig)
	n#S0!(n #S0 1)!
n!
o
 0: The same argument holds for
rm j, so the complete network is pairwise Nash stable under the MJW value.
Second, we show that no rm would nd it weakly protable to sever link ij in the com-
plete network if there exists S  N such that the transshipment problem within S given in
(6)-(9) has a unique optimal transshipment pattern Y g
N jS with Y g
N jS
ij > 0. Consider the or-
dering fi1; i2; :::; i; :::; ing with i = i and the set S0 = fi1; :::; i 1g. When S0 = S; we have
v(gN jS0[fig)   v(gN   ijjS0[fig) > 0 because Y g
N jS
ij > 0 implies that link ij is used for transship-
ment in gN but cannot be used in gN   ij: Thus, we obtain the following inequalities 'MJWi (gN ) 
'MJWi (g
N ij)  v(gN jS[fig)  v(gN   ijjS[fig)	n#S!(n #S 1)!n! o > 0, in which the rst inequal-
ity follows from the rst part of the proof that shows v(gN jS0[fig)   v(gN   ijjS0[fig)  0 for any
S0  Nnfig: The same argument holds for rm j:
Finally, we show that no rm would nd it weakly protable to sever such link ij in any network
derived from the complete network. Consider the network gN   i0j0 derived from the complete
network gN by removing link i0j0 such that 'MJWi0 (g
N )  'MJWi0 (gN   i0j0) and 'MJWj0 (gN ) 
'MJWj0 (g
N   i0j0) according to the denition of the networks derived from the complete network.
From the second part of the proof, we know Y g
N i0j0jS = Y gN jS for any S  N because otherwise
'MJWi0 (g
N ) > 'MJWi0 (g
N   i0j0) and 'MJWj0 (gN ) > 'MJWj0 (gN   i0j0). Using the same argument
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as in the second part of the proof, we can prove that no rm would nd it weakly protable to
sever link ij in the network gN   i0j0 if the transshipment problem within S given in (6)-(9) has a
unique optimal transshipment pattern Y g
N jS with Y g
N jS
ij > 0 for some S  N . We can repeat this
procedure (for example, consider the network derived from the complete network gN   i0j0   i00j00
with 'MJWi00 (g
N   i0j0)  'MJWi00 (gN   i0j0  i00j00) and 'MJWj00 (gN   i0j0)  'MJWj00 (gN   i0j0  i00j00)),
and show that any pairwise Nash stable network g derived from the complete network contains
such ij. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: First, we prove that, with small link cost, any pairwise Nash stable
network derived from the complete network contains link ij such that the transshipment problem
within S given in (6)-(9) has a unique optimal transshipment pattern Y g
N jS with Y g
N jS
ij > 0. For
such ij, we know from the proof of Proposition 6 that 'MJWi (g
N )   'MJWi (gN   ij) > 0. Let l
(> 0) denote the minimum of 'MJWi (g
N ) 'MJWi (gN   ij) > 0 among all such ij: Then, for any ij
that satises the above condition and lij < l, we have 'MJWi (g
N ) 'MJWi (gN   ij)  lij > 0. Next,
we show that no rm would nd it weakly protable to sever such link ij in any network derived
from the complete network. Consider the network gN   i0j0 derived from the complete network
gN by removing link i0j0 such that 'MJWi0 (g
N )   li0j0  'MJWi0 (gN   i0j0) and 'MJWj0 (gN )   lj0i0 
'MJWj0 (g
N   i0j0): By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 6: Y gN i0j0jS = Y gN jS
for any S  N; and we can obtain 'MJWi (gN   i0j0)   'MJWi (gN   i0j0   ij)   lij > 0 and
'MJWj (g
N i0j0) 'MJWj (gN i0j0 ij) lji > 0:We can repeat this procedure (for example, consider
the network derived from the complete network gN   i0j0   i00j00 with 'MJWi00 (gN   i0j0)   li00j00 
'MJWi00 (g
N   i0j0   i00j00) and 'MJWj00 (gN   i0j0)   lj00i00  'MJWj00 (gN   i0j0   i00j00)), and show that
'MJWi (g)  'MJWi (g   ij)  lij > 0 for any network g derived from the complete network.
Second, we show the existence of the subnetwork g stated in the proposition. From the premise
of the proposition, the centralized transshipment problem has a unique optimal transshipment
pattern Y g
N
with Y g
N
ij = 0 and Y
gN
ji = 0: Suppose that there is no link cost. Since link ij is not
used in this problem, there exists an e¢ cient network g such that ij =2 g and v(g) = v(gN ).
This network g is a subnetwork of the pairwise Nash stable networks derived from the complete
network because any pairwise Nash stable network derived from the complete network contains
the links that are used in the centralized transshipment problem. Because lij > 0 or lji > 0, any
pairwise Nash stable networks under the MJW value that contain ij are dominated by g. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2: Under 'FB(g); the expected prot of rm i from both stages is i 
ED[(g;X;D)]. Since i is a constant, the best-response functions of all the rms coincide with
the rst-order conditions in the centralized system. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary 3: Under 'FB(g); the ex-post prot of rm i generated from both stages is
i  (g;X;D) = if
P
i2N
(riminfXi;Dig + uiHi   ciXi  
P
j2Bi(g)
lij) + CTP (g;X;D)g. Since i is a
constant, for given inventory prole X and demand prole D; the objective of rm i is to maximize
CTP (g;X;D) +
P
i2N
(  P
j2Bi(g)
lij) = v(g) 
P
ij2g
(lij + lji) in the partnership announcement subgame.
Therefore, the e¢ cient network g; which maximizes v(g)   P
ij2g
(lij + lji); is pairwise Nash stable
because there is no protable deviation for any rm. The rest of the proof is similar to the proof
of Corollary 2. Q.E.D.
Computing the MJW value in Table 1: In the following, we show how we have obtained the
allocation to rm 1 in Table 1 based on the MJW value in g0 = f12; 23g under Scenario 1. The
rest of the allocations presented in Table 1 can be calculated by following the same procedure.
Consider the following 6 orderings of the three rms: (1) f1; 2; 3g, (2) f1; 3; 2g, (3) f2; 1; 3g, (4)
f3; 1; 2g, (5) f2; 3; 1g, and (6) f3; 2; 1g. The marginal values of rm 1 are all zero in the orderings
(1)-(3), i.e., v(g0jS[f1g)   v(g0jS) = 0; where S is the set of rms before rm 1 in the orderings.
This is because there exists no rm with residual supplies in S, so E1 generates no value. In the
ordering (4), the marginal value of rm 1 is also zero because rms 1 and 3 are not connected
with each other without rm 2. In the ordering (5), v(g0jf2;3g[f1g) = E1 + E2 and v(g0jf2;3g) = E2
because H3  E1 + E2: So the marginal value of rm 1 is E1: Similarly, in the ordering (6), the
marginal value of rm 1 is E1: Therefore, the allocation to rm 1 under the MJW value is the
average marginal value, (E1 + E1)=6 = E1=3:
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Abstract: Counterfeit goods are becoming more sophisticated from shoes to infant milk powder and
aircraft parts, creating problems for consumers, rms, and governments. By comparing two types
of counterfeiters - deceptive, so inltrating a licit (but complicit) distributor, or non-deceptive in an
illicit channel, we provide insights into the impact of anti-counterfeiting strategies on a brand-name
company, a counterfeiter, and consumers. Our analysis highlights that the e¤ectiveness of these
strategies depends critically on whether a brand-name company faces a non-deceptive or decep-
tive counterfeiter. For example, by improving quality, the brand-name company can improve her
expected prot against a non-deceptive counterfeiter when the counterfeiter steals an insignicant
amount of brand value. However, the same strategy does not work against the deceptive counter-
feiter who can get a free ride on the improved quality. Reducing price works well in combating the
non-deceptive counterfeiter, but it could be ine¤ective against the deceptive counterfeiter. More-
over, the strategies that improve the prot of the brand-name company may benet the counterfeiter
inadvertently and even hurt consumer welfare. Therefore, rms and governments should carefully
consider a trade-o¤ among di¤erent objectives in implementing an anti-counterfeiting strategy.
Key words: intellectual property, illegal operations, supply chain management
1 Introduction
Trademarks, also called brands, represent the most valuable assets of many rms, requiring signi-
cant investment in research and development as well as years of e¤orts in maintaining high product
quality and careful brand management. Famous global brands such as GE, Nike and Nestlé are
popular because they o¤er a guarantee of quality, which is vital to consumers when they make
purchasing decisions. For those goods for which the mere display of a particular brand confers
prestige on their owners, such as luxury watches and fashion apparel, many consumers purchase
branded goods to demonstrate that they are consumers of the particular good. These intrinsic
values of trademarks create incentives for counterfeiting.
Nowadays counterfeits have developed into a substantial threat to many industries. The OECD
estimates that international trade in counterfeit could amount to up to $250 billion or 1.95%
of world trade in 2007, up from $105 billion in 2001 (OECD 2009). If including domestically
produced and consumed products, the total magnitude could be several hundred billion dollars
more (OECD 2008). The problem is no longer limited to prestigious and easy-to-manufacture
products, such as designer clothing, branded sportswear, and fashion accessories. It a¤ects nearly
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all product categories including items that have an impact on personal health and safety such as
pharmaceuticals, food, drink, toys, medical equipment, and automotive parts (OECD 2008).
Counterfeits are broadly categorized into two types: non-deceptive and deceptive (Grossman
and Shapiro 1988a). A non-deceptive counterfeit is the counterfeit a consumer can distinguish
from the brand-name product at time of purchase. This type of counterfeits tends to be sold at
a substantial discount through an unauthorized sales channel. For example, consumers can easily
tell that $10 luxury watches sold by street vendors are counterfeit. On the contrary, a deceptive
counterfeit is the counterfeit a consumer believes to be authentic at time of purchase even if it is,
in fact, counterfeit. In order to deceive consumers, this type of counterfeit goods has to inltrate
licit supply chains; for example, fake auto parts were found in legitimate repair shops, counterfeit
pharmaceutical products at chemists, food products on supermarket shelves (OECD 2008), and
pirated software products sold by one of the largest re-sellers (Bass 2010). Solomon (2009) notes
that counterfeit drugs make their way through the licit supply chain via a distributor who moves a
product from a low-cost channel to a high-cost channel. Collusion between counterfeiters and licit
supply chain members occurs due to a higher prot from selling counterfeits (Green and Smith 2002,
Bass 2010). A deceptive counterfeit is usually sold at the price that is the same as or close to that of
its branded product so as to deceive consumers. Although it appears to function properly at time
of purchase, it lacks durability and often involves health and safety risks of consumers. Examples
of deceptive counterfeits abound in both developing and developed countries. In China, after the
luxury furniture sold by the licit retailer turned out to be deceptive counterfeits, customers (who
were previously deceived) have posted details of how their products were shoddily made or reeking
of foul-smelling lacquers (Barboza 2011). In the U.S., a licit distributor who bought counterfeit
networking cards for $25 each sold them to the Marine Corps for $625 each after repackaging the
cards to make them appear to be Cisco products (McKinley 2010); and a number of physicians
bought a fake version of cancer drug Avastin for $1,995 per 400-milligram vial from a Canadian
company (cheaper than $2,400 of authentic Avastin), and billed patients the full list price (Weaver
2012, Weaver et al. 2012).
Brand-name companies are spending millions of dollars in order to stop or at least to reduce the
incidence of counterfeits. They hire full-time employees, invest in new technologies, and redesign
their products to make counterfeiting more di¢ cult (Balfour 2005). However, the anti-counterfeiting
strategies found to be useful to one product may not work for another or can even unintentionally
make counterfeits ourish more in the market. For example, Chinese shoe manufacturers success-
fully addressed their counterfeiting issues by improving the quality of their products (Qian 2008).
This is the outcome of the competition in which high-quality authentic products defeat low-quality
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non-deceptive counterfeits. However, the same strategy backred against a Scotch whisky company
in the Thailand market (Green and Smith 2002). At the peak of the companys sales in 1988, 42%
of its premium Scotch whisky sales was counterfeit; high quality made the products more popular
and attracted more counterfeits. In this case, the counterfeits were sold as the genuine products
and commanding the same price, i.e., sold as deceptive counterfeits. After the initial attempt to
ght counterfeits by improving quality had failed, the company eventually succeeded in radically
reducing the incidence of counterfeiting by establishing a system that monitors supply chains: the
company focused on identifying members in its supply chain who were selling the counterfeits,
facilitating seizure of counterfeits and punishing counterfeiters.
These contrasting results illustrate a need for anti-counterfeiting strategies that are tailored
to specic products. Yet, due to the limited understanding of relations among the types of coun-
terfeits and the e¤ectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies, OECD (2008) calls for research that
strengthens the analysis of counterfeiting and says:
Assessing the factors driving production and consumption of counterfeit and pirated products can
generate insights into the types of products that are most likely to be infringed, . . . , and lead to
more e¢ cient and e¤ective [anti-counterfeiting] strategies.
This paper attempts to provide such an analysis by providing insights to the following questions:
(Q1) What anti-counterfeiting strategies should a brand-name company use to improve her own
prot? (Q2) What is the impact of anti-counterfeiting strategies on the prot of a counterfeiter?
(Q3) What is the impact of counterfeits on consumer welfare? Do consumers also benet from the
strategies that are e¤ective in combating counterfeits?
To answer these questions, we develop a normative model of licit and illicit supply chains, in
which a brand-name company competes with her potential counterfeiter. The counterfeiter in our
model is either non-deceptive or deceptive, and decides the level of functional quality and wholesale
price of his goods after observing the quality and price of the brand-name product. Depending on
his type, the counterfeiter faces di¤erent opportunities and risks. The non-deceptive counterfeiter
competes directly with a brand-name company for price and quality. Thus the counterfeiter may
have to invest in improving the quality of his goods, which will increase the risk of losing the
investment in case of getting caught by the authorities. Conversely, the deceptive counterfeiter may
not need to invest as much in improving the quality as non-deceptive counterfeits (as long as he
can deceive consumers successfully at time of purchase), but he has to inltrate a licit supply chain
via a legitimate distributor who sources both brand-name and counterfeit products. The legitimate
distributor then faces a trade-o¤ between a greater prot margin and a risk of getting punished for
selling counterfeits.
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After nding the equilibrium decisions of the counterfeiter and the distributor, we evaluate
the following anti-counterfeiting strategies of which the e¤ectiveness depends on the subsequent
reaction of the strategic counterfeiter: (i) quality strategy that alters the quality of brand-name
products against a counterfeiter, (ii) pricing strategy that alters the price of brand-name products
against a counterfeiter, (iii) marketing campaign that educates consumers about the dangers of
counterfeits, and (iv) enforcement strategy that increases the chances to seize the production of
counterfeits. Our analysis highlights that the optimal strategy of the brand-name company di¤ers
depending on whether she faces the non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeiter. Although it is ideal to
see the strategies that increase the prot of the brand-name company be also e¤ective in reducing
the prot of the counterfeiter and benet consumers, our analysis shows that this is not the case
for most strategies. It is therefore imperative for industries and governments to understand the
type of potential counterfeiters and to carefully consider a trade-o¤ among di¤erent objectives in
implementing an anti-counterfeiting strategy.
2 Literature Review
Traditional supply chain management research is focused on licit supply chains in which members
of supply chains interact with each other by exchanging goods and services legally. In this era of
globalization, supply chains are no longer conned within one country as more and more companies
o¤shore and outsource their operations to less developed countries. However, this has created a
frightening phenomenon: an ever-rising ood of counterfeit items coming into markets (Business
Week 2005). This paper is intended to shed light on counterfeit problems in both licit and illicit
supply chains and to analyze the e¤ectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies.
The majority of studies on counterfeits are conceptual and descriptive. They provide frame-
works for ghting counterfeiting usually based on case studies. For example, Olsen and Granzin
(1992) emphasize the importance of dealerscooperation for a manufacturer to implement a pro-
gram to combat counterfeits. Jacobs et al. (2001) investigate a number of counterfeiting incidences,
and propose various measures of ghting these illegal activities. Staake and Fleisch (2008) provide
an extensive review of this literature.
Marketing researchers have conducted empirical studies on counterfeits. They mainly focus
on the demand side of counterfeits, and try to answer questions such as why consumers purchase
counterfeits and how to educate consumers not to purchase counterfeits. Eisend and Schuchert-
Guler (2006) review this literature and conclude that further investigation is needed to develop
a general framework that integrates the existing results consistently. Recently, using data from
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Chinese shoe companies, Qian (2008) nds that brand-name companies tend to improve their
product quality after the entry of non-deceptive counterfeiters.
There are only a handful of analytical studies that present prescriptive models of counterfeits.
Grossman and Shapiro (1988a, 1988b) develop equilibrium models of trades between brand-name
rms in a home country and low-quality producers in a foreign country. To sell their goods as
counterfeits in the home market, foreign producers must pass the goods through the home-country
border, hence facing the risk of conscation. Grossman and Shapiro (1988a) analyze the conse-
quences of deceptive counterfeits in a market where consumers cannot observe the quality of a
product, and provide a welfare analysis of border inspection policy. Grossman and Shapiro (1988b)
present a Cournot competition model between brand-name products and non-deceptive counterfeits
given their exogenous quality levels. Because non-deceptive counterfeits can contribute positively
to consumer welfare due to their lower price, the authors conclude that policies that discourage
foreign counterfeiting need not improve welfare, which is consistent with our nding. Scandizzo
(2001) views competition between brand-name rms and non-deceptive counterfeiters as a patent
race over time. The author nds that counterfeits improve consumer welfare while reducing rms
prots, and that the more skewed the income distribution within the economy is towards the poor,
the greater the welfare e¤ect and the smaller the prot e¤ect.
There have been growing interests in counterfeit research among operations researchers. Liu et
al. (2005) study the decision of an inventory manager who can source both genuine and deceptive
counterfeit products and sell them to consumers at one price. Sun et al. (2010) study a global
rms decision of outsourcing the production of its components to a foreign country. The rm faces
a trade-o¤ between lower labor cost and increased risk of imitation by a foreign rm. The authors
nd an optimal strategy in choosing the range of components to transfer. Zhang et al. (2012)
analyze the case when a brand-name rm faces non-deceptive counterfeits. They show that a non-
deceptive counterfeit lowers the price and prot of the brand-name product, and a brand-name rm
has more incentive to improve her own quality rather than reducing that of a counterfeit. They
also analyze a situation in which two brand-name products compete, which we do not consider in
this paper.
We draw on and contribute to this stream of research by addressing the following important
issues in counterfeiting problems:
(1) Strategic counterfeiters: The common assumption used in the literature is that the quality is
xed a priori. For example, Grossman and Shapiro (1988a, 1988b) assume that foreign producers
always choose the lowest quality because they lack capital, resource, and technology for quality
improvement and that there are no entry costs of counterfeiters. Today, thanks to outsourcing
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and o¤shoring of numerous global rms, counterfeiters benet greatly from increasingly easy access
to modern production facilities (Staake and Fleisch 2008). Schmidle (2010) notes that todays
counterfeiters come in varying levels of quality depending on their intended markets, and diversify
their products and distribution channels to manage the risks involved in their criminal activities.
In our model, a counterfeiter decides functional quality and wholesale price of his products by
considering a trade-o¤ between the benet from stealing brand value and the risk of conscation.
Our analysis shows that the e¤ectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies depends critically on the
strategic response of a counterfeiter to those strategies.
(2) Licit and illicit supply chains: The previous analytical papers assume that a counterfeiter
is capable of selling his counterfeits directly to consumers regardless of his type. Although this
is quite possible for non-deceptive counterfeits, a deceptive counterfeiter has to inltrate a licit
supply chain; today, very few consumers would be deceived by the counterfeits sold by street
vendors or unknown websites. We take into account this fundamental di¤erence in supply chains
of non-deceptive and deceptive counterfeits, and demonstrate that an e¤ective strategy against a
non-deceptive counterfeiter may not be e¤ective against a deceptive counterfeiter.
(3) Consumer characteristics: As consumers learn more about counterfeit problems from the media,
they become more aware of the presence of counterfeits, and some even become more proactive
by taking into account the likelihood of receiving deceptive counterfeits unknowingly when they
purchase branded products from licit distributors. Our survey (of which the details are presented
in §3) indicates that the proportion of proactive consumers in the U.S. is substantially lower than
that in China. Our analysis provides insights into how this characteristic of consumers a¤ects the
e¤ectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies.
(4) Evaluation of anti-counterfeiting strategies: We evaluate the aforementioned strategies by ex-
amining their impacts on a brand-name company, a counterfeiter, and consumers. Our analysis
complements the previous ndings (discussed above) of Grossman and Shapiro (1988a, 1988b) and
Zhang et al. (2012). Grossman and Shapiro (1988a, 1988b) provide welfare analyses of border
inspection policies, which are similar to the enforcement policies we study. Today, however, the
conscation of counterfeits not only occurs on the border when trading goods between countries but
also occurs within each country due to the growing demand within its domestic market; in addition,
the seizure of equipment is another threat to counterfeiters (Staake and Fleisch 2008). For exam-
ple, the Chinese authorities, long unconcerned about counterfeiting, have begun to take actions
as Chinese companies create their own intellectual properties (Business Week 2005). Zhang et al.
(2012) focus on analyzing the e¤ect of altering the quality of a brand-name good or a non-deceptive
counterfeit on the prot of a brand-name rm. In doing so, they consider neither potential seizure
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of counterfeits and equipment, nor welfare implication of those strategies.
Finally, we note that a counterfeiters decision of his distribution channel is analogous to that of
a legitimate rm (e.g., Xu et al. 2010), although the benet and risk associated with each channel of
counterfeits are unique as described above. Also, a research question similar to counterfeiting arises
in the literature of parallel importing (or gray market) and software piracy. Parallel importing is the
practice of purchasing products in a lower-priced region and shipping them to a higher priced region
(e.g., Ahmadi and Yang 2000, Hu et al. 2011). While the parallel imported goods are authentic
but sold at a lower price, counterfeits are not authentic, possess lower quality, and are sold at a
lower price for non-deceptive counterfeits or at the same price for deceptive counterfeits. Piracy
di¤ers from counterfeiting in that piracy refers to infringement of copyright. In our model, software
piracy can be viewed as a special case of counterfeiting, in which counterfeit products have almost
the same functional quality as authentic ones but their cost of development and production is very
low. Some of our results can be extended to software piracy problems; for example, consumers
could be better o¤ without piracy protection, which is consistent with Conner and Rumelt (1991).
In summary, the literature considers only one type of counterfeits with xed quality that are sold
directly to consumers. In contrast, our model captures recent changes in counterfeiting supply and
demand by noting the fundamental di¤erences between non-deceptive and deceptive counterfeits
in consumers awareness and distribution channels, and by considering counterfeiters strategic
decisions regarding price and functional quality in a market with di¤erent consumer characteristics.
Our analysis provides novel insights into the e¤ectiveness of several anti-counterfeiting strategies.
3 Model
We consider a market served by a brand-name company (she) and her potential counterfeiter
(he). The type of the counterfeiter is either non-deceptive or deceptive. We use subscript i = B
to denote the brand-name product, i = N to denote the non-deceptive counterfeit, and i = D
to denote the deceptive counterfeit. A consumer in this market purchases at most one unit of a
product. In making a purchasing decision of product i, a consumer considers his/her utility ui =
i   pi, where  represents his/her taste, i represents the quality of the product a consumer
perceives at time of purchase, and pi represents the retail price of the product. All consumers
prefer high quality for a given price, but a consumer with a higher  is more willing to pay to
obtain a high-quality product. We assume that  is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] and that the
size of the market is one. A consumer purchases a product only if the utility from purchasing the
product is nonnegative in which case he/she selects a product that provides the highest utility. This
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is the standard vertical di¤erentiation model, which is also used by Qian (2008) and Zhang et al.
(2012). We next present our model components that capture the unique aspects of counterfeiting.
Depending on the counterfeit type, the quality of product i a consumer perceives at time of pur-
chase, i, may di¤er from its real quality qi. (Throughout this paper, unless mentioned specically
as the perceived quality, quality refers to real quality.) For the non-deceptive counterfeit as well
as the brand-name product, consumers know what product they are purchasing, so the perceived
quality of either product is the same as its real quality; i.e., B = qB and N = qN . However, for
the deceptive counterfeit, consumers cannot distinguish it from the brand-name product at time of
purchase. There are two types of consumers. First, some consumers are not aware of counterfeits,
or even if they are aware, they may consider the likelihood of purchasing counterfeits negligible at
legitimate stores. They perceive the quality of any product in the market as qB; i.e., B = D = qB.
On the other hand, other consumers may be proactive in the sense that they take into account
the likelihood of receiving deceptive counterfeits unknowingly even when purchasing products from
legitimate stores. Let s 2 [0; 1] denote their expectation about the fraction of deceptive counter-
feits in the market. Then proactive consumers perceive the quality of a product in the market as
a weighted average of the quality of the brand-name product and that of the deceptive counterfeit;
i.e., B = D = (1   s)qB + sqD. Let  (2 [0; 1]) denote the fraction of proactive consumers in
the market. In practice,  may vary depending on the characteristic of the market. For example, in
our survey of 166 consumers over 4 popular product categories for deceptive counterfeits (see Table
1), we have found that 51% of consumers in China are proactive, whereas only 4 % of consumers
in the U.S. are proactive. The low value of  in the U.S. reects the view of Rocko¤ and Weaver
(2012), who say: Most Americans dont question the integrity of the drugs they rely on. They
view drug counterfeiting, if they are aware of it at all, as a problem for developing countries.
Table 1. Consumer Survey Results in the U.S. and China
U.S. China
Aware Proactive Aware Proactive
Alcohol 14% 4% 94% 56%
Car Parts 25% 4% 54% 34%
Medical Drugs 41% 5% 86% 51%
Food, Drinks 22% 5% 90% 63%
Average 26% 4% 81% 51%
(Note) Respondents are college students and faculty with ages from 18 to 50. The number of respondents is 86
in the U.S., and it is 80 in China. Two questions were asked in the questionnaire: (1) Are you aware of the sale
of counterfeits in each of the above product categories; and (2) For each product category in which you are aware
of the sale of counterfeits, do you take into account the risk of getting a counterfeit and therefore discount the
value of the product when you purchase a brand-name product at a full price in a legal store? Those customers who
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answered yes to (1) are considered Aware, and those customers who answered yes to both (1) and (2) are considered
proactive. The absolute numbers may be escalated because respondents may be reminded of counterfeits by the
questionnaire. Our survey indicates that being awareof the existence of counterfeits di¤ers from being proactive.
One may explain such di¤erence from cognitive psychology (e.g., Bendoly et al. 2010, Goldsmith and Amir 2010,
and references therein); for example, it may be due to a positive-outcome bias or wishful thinking caused by
overestimating the probability of good things happening.
Since the counterfeit bears the trademark of the brand-name product, a consumer enjoys the
brand image even when he/she purchases the counterfeit. Thus we may represent the quality of
the counterfeit as qi = fi + qB (i = N or D), where fi (> 0) is the functional quality of the
counterfeit i and qB (where  > 0) is the brand value that the counterfeit steals from the brand-
name product. Essentially, we assume that a product has two attributes: functionality and brand
value as in multi-attribute models in marketing (e.g., see Lilien et al. 1992). Brand value reects
advertising investments on which a counterfeiter may get a free ride. The parameter  captures
the following two factors. First,  captures a fraction of the brand value in the quality of the
brand-name product, qB. For example, this fraction may be high for luxury goods because a brand
plays a signicant role when consumers purchase such products, whereas it may be low for fast
moving consumer goods (which are sold quickly at relatively low cost) because a brand is less of a
concern to consumers for such goods. Second,  captures a discount factor of the original brand
value for the counterfeit because the counterfeit draws only a part of the brand value from the
brand-name product.1 Following the literature, we assume that the quality of the brand-name
product is superior to that of the counterfeit; i.e., qB > qN and qB > qD.
Either type of counterfeiter i (= N or D) makes two decisions sequentially to maximize his
expected prot: functional quality fi and wholesale price wi to a distributor. We assume that
the counterfeiter makes these decisions after observing the quality qB and price pB of a brand-
name product because counterfeiters always enter a market following a brand-name company, often
after the brand-name product becomes popular. Di¤erent types of counterfeiters use di¤erent
distribution channels to sell their goods. The non-deceptive counterfeiter (i = N) distributes his
goods through an illicit distributor, who then decides the retail price of the non-deceptive counterfeit
to consumers, pN . On the other hand, the deceptive counterfeiter (i = D) has to break into a licit
supply chain by distributing his goods through a licit distributor, who then sells both brand-name
products and deceptive counterfeits to consumers at the same price pB: In this case, the licit
distributor determines a proportion s 2 [0; 1] of the deceptive counterfeit among all products he
1For some counterfeits, as their functional quality increases, they might look more similar to branded products so
that they can steal a higher fraction of the brand quality. This can be modeled by setting  = 1 + 2fi; where 1
captures the characteristic of a product category (like  in our base model), and 2 captures the property mentioned
above. All our subsequent results hold under this alternative model.
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sells to consumers. We next describe the details of our model for non-deceptive and deceptive
counterfeits, respectively.
When a non-deceptive counterfeiter exists in the market and sells his products through the
illicit distributor, consumers will choose between the brand-name product and the counterfeit.
Both products carry the same brand, but have di¤erent qualities and prices. The competition
between the non-deceptive counterfeiter and the brand-name company is analogous to duopoly
in a vertically di¤erentiated market, but it is not the same because the members of the illicit
supply chain bear the risks associated with counterfeiting. The non-deceptive counterfeiter and
the illicit distributor make their decisions in three sequential stages as follows. In stage 1, the
non-deceptive counterfeiter chooses his functional quality fN 2 [f; f ], where f > f  0, and makes
initial investment to develop and produce goods having fN . The upper bound f may represent
the functional quality of the brand-name product. We assume f < (1   )qB such that qB > qN :
The lower bound f may represent the minimum level of quality at which a product functions or
appears to function properly. To produce counterfeits having fN , the counterfeiter needs to invest
tNf
2
N in acquiring technology and setting up production facilities, where tN > 0: This implies that
the development of a product with higher quality requires increasingly more investment. The unit
production cost of the counterfeit is normalized to zero. After the investment takes place, however,
there are some chances that the investment will be conscated because it is illegal to produce
counterfeits. Suppose this occurs with a probability  2 (0; 1): The parameter  captures the
monitoring e¤orts of the government and the brand-name company on counterfeit production. The
potential loss of the investment is a major risk to the counterfeiter that deters him from making large
investments to improve the functional quality of his products (OECD 2008). If the counterfeiters
investment is conscated, the counterfeiter cannot sell his goods to the market. Otherwise, the
game proceeds to stage 2 in which the non-deceptive counterfeiter decides his wholesale price wN
to the illicit distributor. For simplicity, we represent all distributors/retailers in the illicit supply
chain as one illicit distributor. In stage 3, the illicit distributor decides the retail price of the non-
deceptive counterfeit to consumers, pN . The illicit distributor has to pay a penalty of lN if getting
caught by the authorities with probability N .
When a deceptive counterfeiter exists in the market and sells his products through the licit
distributor, consumers cannot distinguish deceptive counterfeits from brand-name products. Like
the non-deceptive counterfeiter, the deceptive counterfeiter determines his functional quality fD 2
[f; f ] in stage 1, while facing the risk of getting his investment tDf2D conscated. In stage 2, the
deceptive counterfeiter decides his wholesale price wD to the licit distributor, who later sells the
counterfeits to consumers at the same price pB as the brand-name products. In stage 3, the licit
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distributor determines a proportion s of the deceptive counterfeit among all products he sells to
consumers. We model the risk of the licit distributor selling deceptive counterfeits with a likelihood
D of getting caught and a penalty lD. Since D tends to increase with more counterfeits in the
market, we set D equal to the fraction of deceptive counterfeits, s. In §7, we consider a more
general case in which D is a function of fD as well as s.
We make the following assumptions to simplify our analysis. First, we assume that the licit
distributor does not make a prot from selling brand-name products, while it makes a positive
prot from selling deceptive counterfeits. Our results continue to hold for any xed margin of the
licit distributor from selling brand-name products. In online appendix C, we also analyze the case
where the licit distributor decides its prot margins endogenously. Second, we normalize lN = 0;
while having lD = l > 0: In practice, a loss of an illicit distributor from potential seizure is much
smaller than that of a licit distributor. Illicit distributors are usually street vendors or internet sites.
Since their potential loss from seizure is small, they tend to close their stores temporarily when they
get caught and then reopen the same stores or open new ones later. For example, vendors in the
Xiang Yang market in Shanghai, China, which were once famous for their high-quality counterfeits
but closed due to the governments massive campaigns in 2006, relocated to the Yatai Xinyang
market that is now famous among tourists (Naumann 2009). In contrast, the punishment on the
licit distributor for illegal distribution of deceptive counterfeits is very severe. For example, the
Chinese court sentenced the distributor of fake pills to 17 years in prison, the nations longest
term for the crime (Bennett 2010) and the U.S. court sentenced a distributor who sold counterfeit
networking cards to the military to 51 months in prison, the maximum term recommended by
federal prosecutors (McKinley 2010). Third, for both types of counterfeits, we assume that the
probability of counterfeits getting conscated at the production level () is independent of that at
the distribution level (N or D). In practice, it is extremely di¢ cult to trace back the source of
counterfeits even after discovering their distributors. For example, counterfeit versions of cancer
drugs Faslodex and Avastin were detected at the distribution level in the U.S., but their sources
have not been determined while suspecting o¤shore production (Rocko¤ et al. 2012, Weaver et al.
2012). Table 2 summarizes the notation of major variables and parameters.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we present our model formulation and equilibrium analysis. We use backward
induction to derive subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In §4.1 we present equilibrium (denoted
by superscript ) in a market with a non-deceptive counterfeiter. In §4.2 we present equilibrium
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(denoted by superscript ) in a market with a deceptive counterfeiter. All proofs are provided in
online appendix A.
Table 2. Summary of Key Notation
Symbol Denition
i Brand-name product (= B), non-deceptive counterfeit (= N); deceptive counterfeit (= D)
 Taste of consumers; ~U [0; 1]
pi Retail price of product i to consumers
qi (Real) Quality of product i
fi Functional quality of counterfeit product i; fi 2 [f; f ]
i Expected prot from selling product i
wi Wholesale price of product i to a distributor
ti Cost parameter used in the cost of developing functional quality
 Fraction of the quality of brand-name products that counterfeits steal;  2

0; 1  fqB

 Probability that a counterfeiters investment will be conscated;  2 (0; 1)
l Loss of the licit distributor if getting caught for selling deceptive counterfeits; l > 0
 Fraction of proactive consumers in the market;  2 [0; 1]
s Fraction of deceptive counterfeits among all products the licit distributor sells; s 2 [0; 1]
4.1 Non-Deceptive Counterfeits
Suppose the brand-name product and the non-deceptive counterfeit exist in the market. There are
three segments of consumers: (i) consumers who value the quality of a product highly and purchase
the brand-name product, (ii) consumers who value the quality less and purchase the non-deceptive
counterfeit, and (iii) consumers who value the quality the least and do not purchase any product.
The consumer who is indi¤erent between purchasing the brand-name product and the non-deceptive
counterfeit has the taste e = pB pNqB qN = pB pN(1 )qB fN , which solves eqN pN = eqB pB: Similarly, the
consumer who is indi¤erent between purchasing the non-deceptive counterfeit and not purchasing
any product has the taste b = pNqN = pNfN+qB : Let mi (2 [0; 1]) denote the market share of product
i (= B or N), and let m0 denote the proportion of consumers who do not purchase any product,
so that mB +mN +m0 = 1. Then:
mB = 1  e = 1  pB   pN
(1  )qB   fN and mN =
e   b = pB   pN
(1  )qB   fN  
pN
fN + qB
: (1)
In stage 3, the illicit distributor determines the retail price to consumers, pN , by solving:
max
pN
(pN   wN )mN = (pN   wN )

pB   pN
(1  )qB   fN  
pN
fN + qB

: (2)
By noting that the prot of the illicit distributor in (2) is concave in pN , one can easily obtain her
optimal retail price pN (wN ; fN ) =
(qB+fN )pB+qBwN
2qB
:
In stage 2, the non-deceptive counterfeiter determines his wholesale price wN . By anticipating
the best response of the illicit distributor, the non-deceptive counterfeiter chooses his optimal
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wholesale price that maximizes his expected prot given by:
N (wN ; fN ) = (1  )

wN

pB   pN
qB   qN  
pN
qN

  tNf2N

  tNf2N : (3)
In (3), (1 ) represents the likelihood that the counterfeiter is able to sell his goods without being
conscated, and the next term in the bracket represents the prot of the counterfeiter in that case.
The initial investment tNf2N is considered a sunk cost in (3). Note that whether the conscation of
investment occurs after stage 1 or stage 2 does not a¤ect the counterfeiters decisions. If conscation
occurs after some units are sold, (1  ) can be interpreted as the fraction of sales the counterfeiter
has generated before conscation. Since N is concave in wN , we can easily obtain the optimal
wholesale price wN and the corresponding expected prot of the non-deceptive counterfeiter 

N ,
respectively, as follows:
wN (fN ) =
pB(fN + qB)
2qB
and N (fN ) =
p2B(1  )(fN + qB)
8qB f(1  )qB   fNg   tNf
2
N : (4)
By substituting wN into p

N , one can verify that the illicit distributor charges a lower price than
that of the brand-name product; i.e., pN < pB.
In stage 1, the non-deceptive counterfeiter decides the functional quality fN by considering
his optimal wholesale price in stage 2 and the best response of the illicit distributor in stage 3.
The counterfeiter solves max
fN2[f;f]
N (fN ) by considering the following trade-o¤: a higher level of
functional quality will draw more consumers, but it requires more investment, hence increasing a
potential loss from seizure.
Lemma 1 For any given (pB; qB), the optimal functional quality of non-deceptive counterfeits, fN ,
is as follows: if tN <
(1 )p2B
4f(1 )qB fg3 and 

N (f)  N (f), then fN = f , and otherwise fN can be f
or fN 2 (f; f) that satises @

N
@fN
jfN=fN = 0:
Lemma 1 shows that the non-deceptive counterfeiter may not always choose the lowest quality in
contrast to the common assumption used in the literature (e.g., Grossman and Shapiro 1988a,b).
In the past, non-deceptive counterfeits with low functional quality such as brand-name costumes,
footwear and accessories dominated a counterfeit market. Their functional quality is just enough
for consumers to use them, but their durability and performance are substandard. Consumers who
purchase such counterfeits are those who want to enjoy the snob appeal of brands, but do not want
to pay the high price of genuine goods. However, in todays counterfeit markets, counterfeiters come
in varying levels of quality depending on their intended markets (Schmidle 2010). For example,
some counterfeit electronic devices such as cell phones include appealing features which are not
included even in authentic products. This is called Shan-Zhai phenomenon in China. According
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to Gartner, Shan-Zhai phones account for more than 20 percent of sales in China (Barboza 2009).
These counterfeiters usually face the least pressure from local enforcement agencies and some are
likely to turn into licit competitors once intellectual property rights become more strictly enforced
(Staake and Fleisch 2008). Our result stated in Lemma 1 is consistent with this observation of
todays counterfeit markets.
4.2 Deceptive Counterfeits
Suppose the brand-name product and the deceptive counterfeit exist in the market. In this case,
both brand-name products and deceptive counterfeits are sold at price pB: While proactive con-
sumers with proportion  perceive the quality of a product in the market as (1   s)qB + sqD,
the rest of consumers perceive the quality of a product in the market as qB. Similar to Grossman
and Shapiro (1988a), we assume that the expectation of proactive consumers about the fraction
of deceptive counterfeits in the market is rational and hence is equal, in equilibrium, to the actual
fraction of counterfeits; i.e., s = s. This notion of rational expectations equilibrium is also used in
the recent operations management literature (e.g., Su and Zhang 2008, Cachon and Swinney 2009).
Similar to §4.1, we can obtain the market share of the brand-name product and that of the
deceptive counterfeit, respectively, as follows:
mB = (1  s)(1  ) and mD = s(1  ); (5)
where 1    1  pB(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)  
(1 )pB
qB
represents the aggregate demandfor both brand-
name and counterfeit products at price pB. Among those consumers who purchase products for
pB, a fraction s of them receives deceptive counterfeits unknowingly.
In stage 3, the licit distributor solves the following problem to determine s:
max
s2[0;1]
s(1  s)(pB   wD)

1  pB
(1  s)qB + s(fD + qB)  
(1  )pB
qB

  sl: (6)
In (6), (1  s) represents the likelihood that the distributor will not be detected for selling counter-
feits and s(pB   wD)
n
1  pB(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)  
(1 )pB
qB
o
represents the distributors prot in that
case. Recall that the distributors prot margin from selling brand-name products is assumed zero
(see §3). The term  slin (6) represents the expected loss from potential seizure. From (6), we
can show that the prot of the distributor is strictly decreasing in s for s 2 [12   ; 1]; where  is
a small and positive constant. Moreover, the prot given in (6) is concave in s for s < 12 : Thus,
s is 0 or it satises the rst order condition in (0; 0:5). In the remainder of this paper, we only
consider the latter case (i.e., s 2 (0; 0:5)) because there will be no deceptive counterfeits in the
market when the counterfeiter fails to break into the licit supply chain (i.e., s = 0).
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In stage 2, the deceptive counterfeiter decides his wholesale price wD to maximize his expected
prot given by:
D(wD; fD) = (1  )

wDs


1  pB
(1  s)qB + s(fD + qB)  
(1  )pB
qB

  tDf2D

  tDf2D:
(7)
By noting that D is continuous in wD 2 [0; pB]; we know that the optimal wholesale price wD
always exists in [0; pB]: In the case when  > 0; the closed-form expressions for s and wD
do not exist. In the case when  = 0, we can obtain from the rst-order condition of (6) that
s(wD; fD) = 12   lqB2(pB wD)(qB pB) . By substituting s into (7) and solving maxwD2[0;pB ] D(wD; fD),
we obtain wD and the corresponding expected prot of the deceptive counterfeiter 

D as follows:
wD (fD) = pB  
s
lpB
1  pBqB
and D (fD) =
1
2
(1  )
(s
pB

1  pB
qB

 
p
l
)2
  tDf2D: (8)
From (8), we can generate the following insights. First, as the risk of the licit distributor selling
counterfeits increases with l, the deceptive counterfeiter has to reduce his price wD to compensate
for the increased risk, resulting in a decrease in his expected prot D . Second, 

D increases
with pB

1  pBqB

; which is the revenue of the brand-name company without counterfeits. This is
because the deceptive counterfeit gets a free ride on the brand name of the genuine product.
In stage 1, the counterfeiter decides the functional quality fD by considering his optimal whole-
sale price in stage 2 and the best response of the licit distributor in stage 3. The following lemma
shows that the deceptive counterfeiter may choose a di¤erent level of functional quality depending
on the fraction of proactive consumers in the market, .
Lemma 2 For any given (pB; qB), when  = 0, the optimal functional quality of deceptive coun-
terfeits fD is f . When  > 0; there exists tD (> 0) such that if tD  tD; fD = f; and otherwise
fD can be f or f

D 2 (f; f) that satises @

D
@fD
jfD=fD = 0:
In the market with no proactive consumers (i.e.,  = 0); as one would expect, the deceptive coun-
terfeiter always chooses the lower bound f for his functional quality because improving quality
does not increase counterfeit sales. In this case, although a counterfeit is visually identical to
its brand-name product, its low quality may result in a substantial nancial loss to consumers
or even endanger their health and safety. Consequently, both counterfeiter and distributor often
face considerable punishments if they get caught. Typical examples are food, beverage, agricul-
tural products, pharmaceuticals, and automotive spare parts (OECD 2008, Staake and Fleisch
2008). In the market with proactive consumers (i.e.,  > 0), although consumers cannot distin-
guish the deceptive counterfeit from the brand-name product, the deceptive counterfeiter can still
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nd it optimal to improve his functional quality above the minimum level f . The reason is as
follows. When fD is improved, both aggregate demand for brand-name and counterfeit products,
1   pB(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)  
(1 )pB
qB
; and the fraction of deceptive counterfeits, s; are increased.
Thus the marginal benet of functional quality is positive. If the marginal benet exceeds the
marginal cost, then the deceptive counterfeiter will choose his functional quality fD above f . In
practice, some deceptive counterfeits reveal di¤erent levels of functional quality; for example, fake
gasoline with di¤erent levels of adulteration has been reported (Lee et al. 2011).
5 Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies: Quality and Price
Having analyzed the equilibrium decisions of counterfeiters and distributors in licit and illicit supply
chains, we examine the e¤ectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies: quality and pricing strategies
in §5, and marketing and enforcement strategies in §6. We analyze each strategy separately in
order to isolate its e¤ect on rmsprots and consumer welfare. When a rm implements multiple
strategies simultaneously, one needs to aggregate the e¤ect of each strategy to evaluate the overall
e¤ect.
We examine the e¤ectiveness of quality and pricing strategies against the non-deceptive coun-
terfeiter in §5.1, and against the deceptive counterfeiter in §5.2; then, we compare them in §5.3. In
each of §5.1 and §5.2, we proceed our analysis as follows. First, we examine whether the brand-name
company should choose higher/lower quality or price than the case with no counterfeiter in order to
maximize her expected prot against the counterfeiter. Let qmB and p
m
B denote the optimal quality
and price of the brand-name product with no counterfeiter in the market, respectively. Similarly,
let qB and p

B (resp., q

B and p

B ) denote the optimal quality and price of the brand-name product
in the presence of the non-deceptive (resp., deceptive) counterfeiter, respectively. Second, knowing
that such strategies of choosing qB and p

B (resp., q

B and p

B ) instead of q
m
B and p
m
B improve the
expected prot of the brand-name company, we examine how those strategies a¤ect the expected
prot of the non-deceptive (resp., deceptive) counterfeiter. Finally, we investigate how those strate-
gies a¤ect expected consumer welfare, which is dened as follows. When only brand-name products
exist in the market, we can dene consumer welfare as CSB =
R 1
pB
qB
(qB   pB)d. Similarly, using
(1) and (5), we can dene CSN or CSD as consumer welfare in the market where non-deceptive or
deceptive counterfeits co-exist with brand-name products, respectively, as follows:
CSN =
Z e
b (qN   pN ) d +
Z 1
e (qB   pB)d; (9)
CSD = s
Z 1

(qD   pB) d + (1  s)
Z 1

(qB   pB) d: (10)
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In (9), the rst term represents the surplus of those consumers who purchase the non-deceptive
counterfeit and the second term represents the surplus of those consumers who purchase the brand-
name product. In (10), the rst term represents the surplus of those consumers who are cheated
and receive the deceptive counterfeit although they pay the price of the brand-name product, and
the second term represents the surplus of those consumers who purchase and receive the brand-
name product. Considering the chances that counterfeits do not reach the market due to seizure,
we can further dene ECSN or ECSD as the expected consumer welfare when the counterfeiter is
non-deceptive or deceptive, respectively, as follows:
ECSN = (1  )CSN + CSB and ECSD = (1  )CSD + CSB: (11)
Let ECSN or ECS

D denote the corresponding expected consumer welfare in equilibrium. We can
show that ECSD < CSB < ECS

N . Intuition from this result is as follows. When non-deceptive
counterfeits exist in the market, a consumer has a cheap alternative to the brand-name product. In
equilibrium, the non-deceptive counterfeiter sets his price and functional quality such that he o¤ers
a higher utility to those consumers who enjoy the brand value of the brand-name product but do not
appreciate its high quality or cannot a¤ord its high price. Therefore, non-deceptive counterfeits
improve consumer welfare. In contrast, when deceptive counterfeits exist, some consumers are
cheated to receive low-quality deceptive counterfeits, resulting in a welfare loss.2
5.1 Non-Deceptive Counterfeits
This subsection examines the brand-name companys anti-counterfeiting strategies against the non-
deceptive counterfeiter. We rst examine the brand-name companys quality strategy to combat
the non-deceptive counterfeiter. In the following proposition, we present the results for the case
when fN = f or f , since the exposition of our results is much simpler in this case, while presenting
the results for the case when fN 2 (f; f) in online appendix A (which involve complex conditions
for parts (a) and (c)).
Proposition 1 Suppose fN = f or f: Then:
(a) qB > q
m
B if and only if  < 1 
n
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
o2
.
2We do not consider the socio-economic e¤ects of counterfeiting on corruption, criminal activities, employment,
environment, innovation, tax revenues, and so on. If taking into account these indirect or long-term e¤ects into
account, then non-deceptive counterfeits may also decrease consumer welfare. Moreover, the anti-counterfeiting
strategies that reduce the incidence of counterfeits (e.g., marketing campaigns that reduce ) can have more positive
benets by lessening these harmful e¤ects. We can also examine the aggregate e¤ect of anti-counterfeiting strategies
on social welfare, which may be dened as SWi = ECSi+B i for i = N or D, by combining the results of prots
and consumer welfare.
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(b) Suppose qB > q
m
B (resp:; q

B < q
m
B ). Then 

N is lower (resp., higher) at qB = q

B than at
qB = q
m
B :
(c) Suppose qB > q
m
B (resp:; q

B < q
m
B ). Then ECS

N is higher (resp., lower) at qB = q

B than at
qB = q
m
B unless f

N is decreased from f at qB = q
m
B to f at qB = q

B:
First, consider the case when the non-deceptive counterfeit draws an insignicant amount of brand
value from the brand-name product (i.e.,  < 1 fqmB  qN (qmB )g2=(qmB )2). In this case, Proposition
1(a) shows that the brand-name company should set her product quality higher than qmB . This
strategy not only improves the expected prot of the brand-name company (as compared to choosing
qB = q
m
B ), but also decreases the expected prot of the non-deceptive counterfeiter (Proposition
1(b)). In this case, even though the improved quality of the brand-name product also improves the
quality of the non-deceptive counterfeit, the di¤erence in quality between two competing products
becomes larger because the counterfeit steals only a small part of the brand value (i.e., low ).
Consequently, the non-deceptive counterfeiter will lose its quality competition against the brand-
name company. This result may explain how the shoe manufacturers mentioned in §1 successfully
addressed their counterfeiting issues by improving the quality of their products (Qian 2008). Finally,
Proposition 1(c) shows that, although this strategy improves the expected prot of the brand-name
company and reduces the expected prot of the non-deceptive counterfeiter, it does not always
benet consumers. The reason is as follows. This strategy can lead the non-deceptive counterfeiter
to lower his functional quality as well as his wholesale price in order to compete better against
brand-name products with improved quality. Although this reduces the market share of non-
deceptive counterfeits, those consumers who purchase non-deceptive counterfeits can su¤er from
lower quality, resulting a welfare loss. For example, Figure 1 illustrates that ECSN falls when qB
is increased from qmB = 3:37 to q

B = 3:4:
Next, consider the case when the non-deceptive counterfeit draws a signicant amount of brand
value from the brand-name product (i.e.,  > 1 fqmB  qN (qmB )g2=(qmB )2). In this case, Proposition
1(a) shows that it is not cost-e¤ective for the brand-name company to improve her product quality
because the non-deceptive counterfeiter gets a free ride on the improved quality of the brand-name
product. While this strategy improves the expected prot of the brand-name company, it can also
help the non-deceptive counterfeiter earn higher expected prot inadvertently (Proposition 1(b)),
and make consumers su¤er from the poor quality of the product (Proposition 1(c)). Therefore,
in this case, the brand-name company may not use this strategy to combat the non-deceptive
counterfeiter, and if she does, she must take special case to curb counterfeits in the market.
The following proposition shows how the brand-name company can combat the non-deceptive
counterfeiter through her pricing strategy.
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Figure 1: Expected consumer welfare as a function of qB when non-deceptive counterfeits are in the
market (Base parameters: t = 0:01, pB = 0:9,  = 0:1,  = 0:58; c = 0:05; f = 0:1; and f = 2:5)
Proposition 2 (a) pB < p
m
B for all .
(b) N is lower at pB = p

B than at pB = p
m
B for all :
(c) ECSN is higher at pB = p

B than at pB = p
m
B unless f

N is decreased from f at pB = p
m
B to f
at pB = pB or
@fN
@pB
>  (where the expression of  (> 0) is presented in the proof).
In contrast to the earlier quality strategy, Proposition 2(a) shows that for any , it is always
benecial for the brand-name company to set her price pB lower than p
m
B . This is because a lower
price enables the brand-name company to compete better against non-deceptive counterfeits which
are cheap alternatives of brand-name products. This strategy helps the brand-name company to
gain more market share by inducing some consumers to switch from non-deceptive counterfeits to
brand-name goods. As a result, this strategy also reduces the expected prot of the non-deceptive
counterfeiter (Proposition 2(b)). We further nd that the larger  is, the faster the expected prot of
the non-deceptive counterfeiter will decrease. This is because the brand-name company relies more
on price to compete with the non-deceptive counterfeiter when the quality levels of two products
are not so distinguished due to the larger . However, similar to the quality strategy, Proposition
2(c) shows that reducing pB can hurt consumers by inducing the non-deceptive counterfeiter to
reduce his quality level. This strategy has been used in practice; for example, the distributors of
Hollywood lms cut their DVD prices in Malaysia and Russia to combat rampant piracy (Whang
2001, Arvedlung 2004).
5.2 Deceptive Counterfeits
This subsection examines the brand-name companys anti-counterfeiting strategies against the de-
ceptive counterfeiter. As we will show below, most e¤ects of these strategies are monotonic when
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no proactive consumers exist in the market (i.e,  = 0), whereas all e¤ects of these strategies are
non-monotonic when proactive consumers exist in the market (i.e.,  > 0). Thus, we rst examine
the former case analytically to establish monotonic results, and then conduct a numerical study for
the latter case to show non-monotonicity. This approach will enable us to isolate the e¤ect of , and
explore dominant e¤ects of anti-counterfeiting strategies when positive  creates non-monotonic ef-
fects. Note that the results under  = 0 also bear some practical relevance (asymptotically) because
only a small fraction of consumers may be proactive in developed countries; for example,  = 0:04
in the U.S. in our survey results shown in Table 1.
Let us rst analyze the case when  = 0: The following proposition shows, counter-intuitively,
that by setting the quality level lower than the quality level with no counterfeiter in the market, the
brand-name company can improve her expected prot, reduce the expected prot of the deceptive
counterfeiter, and even improve expected consumer welfare.
Proposition 3 Consider the market with  = 0. In this market, the following results hold:
(a) qB < q
m
B :
(b) D is lower at qB = q

B than at qB = q
m
B .
(c) ECSD is higher at qB = q

B than at qB = q
m
B if q

D < qB   (1 p
2
Bq
 2
B )f1 (1 )sg
2(1 ) f
p2B
q3B
s +
1
2

1  p2B
q2B

@s
@qB
g 1 for qB 2 [qB ; qmB ].
Proposition 3(a) states that it is optimal for the brand-name company to set her quality qB lower
than qmB . Since consumers cannot distinguish deceptive counterfeits from brand-name products,
this strategy reduces the perceived quality of any product in the market, and thus reduces the
aggregate demand for both brand-name and counterfeit goods. However, the reduced aggregate
demand discourages the licit distributor from taking the risk of selling deceptive counterfeits, hence
resulting in a lower s. The result stated in Proposition 3(a) suggests that the latter (positive)
e¤ect dominates the former (negative) e¤ect, so this strategy improves the expected prot of the
brand-name company. This result highlights the importance of modeling the incentive of the licit
distributor in this supply chain: Without the licit distributor, the positive e¤ect of this strategy
(i.e., lower s) would not exist and therefore the result opposite to Proposition 3(a) would be
obtained. Since this strategy reduces both the aggregate demand and the proportion of deceptive
counterfeits sold by the licit distributor, it will also reduce the expected prot of the deceptive
counterfeiter (Proposition 3(b)). (More generally, we show in the proof that D is increasing
in qB for any .) Finally, contrary to our rst intuition that lower quality will hurt consumers,
Proposition 3(c) suggests that this strategy can improve consumer welfare. To understand this
result, note that there are two opposing e¤ects of having lower quality of brand-name products
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on consumer welfare: Consumers su¤er from lower quality and fewer consumers buy products, but
at the same time fewer consumers are deceived to buy low-quality counterfeits. Proposition 3(c)
shows that when the quality of deceptive counterfeits is su¢ ciently low, the latter e¤ect outweighs
the former e¤ect, beneting consumers.
We next examine the e¤ectiveness of the pricing strategy against the deceptive counterfeiter in
the market with  = 0:
Proposition 4 Consider the market with  = 0. In this market, the following results hold:
(a) pB > p
m
B :
(b) D can be higher or lower when pB = p

B than when pB = p
m
B .
(c) ECSD is higher at pB = p

B than at pB = p
m
B if q

D < qB  qB pB1  fpBqB s 12

1 + pBqB

(qB   pB) @s@pB g 1
for pB 2 [pmB ; pB ]:
With no proactive consumers in the market, Proposition 4(a) states that the brand-name company
can improve her expected prot by setting her price pB higher than p
m
B (due to the reason similar
to Proposition 3(a)). Unlike the earlier quality strategy, however, this pricing strategy has non-
monotonic impact on the expected prot of the deceptive counterfeiter (Proposition 4(b)). To
understand this result, note that there are two e¤ects of raising pB : (i) it reduces the aggregate
demand for brand-name and counterfeit goods (i.e., @@pB

1  pBqB

< 0); and (ii) it increases the
distributors margin from selling deceptive counterfeits (i.e., @@pB (pB   wD ) = @@pB
r
lpB
1  pB
qB
> 0 from
(8)). Because of the latter e¤ect, the strategy of raising pB does not always reduce the proportion
s of deceptive counterfeits the licit distributor sells, nor does it always reduce the deceptive
counterfeiters market share mD and her expected prot 

D . Therefore, in implementing this
pricing strategy, a rm or the government should carefully consider these two counterbalancing
e¤ects of raising/reducing price. In practice, we observe both instances of raising or reducing
prices: Newton et al. (2002) propose reducing drug prices to make counterfeiting less attractive by
reducing the prot margins of fake drugs (i.e., opposite e¤ect of (ii)), and Russia will raise vodka
prices to put out of business makers of counterfeit alcohol (via e¤ect (i)) although it will also a¤ect
licit companies (Reuters 2012). Finally, Proposition 4(c) suggests that this strategy can improve
consumer welfare when the quality of deceptive counterfeits is su¢ ciently low. We can interpret
this result similarly to Proposition 3(c).
Next, we analyze the case in which proactive consumers exist in the market (i.e.,  > 0).
As we have mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, this additional factor causes all the
e¤ects of the anti-counterfeiting strategies to become non-monotonic. Specically, the brand-name
companys optimal quality qB (resp., p

B ), can be higher or lower than her quality q
m
B with no
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counterfeiter (resp., pmB ); furthermore, the deceptive counterfeiters expected prot 

D and the
expected consumer welfare ECSD are non-monotonic with a change of qB or pB. Because the
closed-form expressions of s; wD and f

D do not exist when  > 0, no simple conditions can be
derived analytically for monotonic results (see remarks on the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 in
online appendix A). For this reason, we conduct a numerical study to compare the results under
 = 0 with those under  > 0, and explore dominant e¤ects. The numerical experiments are
conducted with the following settings: for  = 0; 0:25 or 0:5, we constructed 1024 scenarios using
the parameter values shown at the bottom of Table 3, so that they cover various possible scenarios
and also satisfy positive s in equilibrium. We present a summary of the results in Table 3, which
reads as follows: for example, when  = 0:5, qB < q
m
B was observed in 97.3% of 1024 scenarios, and
choosing qB reduced 

D in 97.3% of 1024 scenarios and increased ECS

D in 5.3% as compared to
choosing qmB .
Table 3. E¤ects of Quality and Pricing Strategies against Deceptive Counterfeits
E¤ects of Choosing qB vs. q
m
B E¤ects of Choosing p

B vs. p
m
B
qB < q
m
B 

D # ECSD " pB > pmB D # ECSD "
 = 0 1 1 0.032 1 0.097 0.016
 = 0:25 0.961 0.961 0.052 0.989 0.398 0.048
 = 0:5 0.973 0.973 0.053 0.984 0.454 0.039
(Note) Each number in the table indicates a percent of scenarios for the corresponding e¤ect. We used the fol-
lowing parameters: t 2{0.005,0.01,0.015,0.02},  2{0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4},  2{0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4}, l 2{0.005,0.01,0.015,0.02},
c 2{0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4}, f = 0:1; and f = (1  )  qB   0:1.
From Table 3, we can observe the following:
(1) The results obtained under  = 0 continue to hold in most scenarios under  > 0. However,
in some scenarios, the brand-name company nds it optimal to set qB > q
m
B or p

B < p
m
B . We
can explain this result as follows. First, recall from our discussions above that setting lower qB
or higher pB reduces the aggregate demand for brand-name and counterfeit goods, and that the
reduced aggregate demand discourages the licit distributor from taking the risk of selling counter-
feits. Propositions 3(a) and 4(a) suggest that the latter (positive) e¤ect always dominates the former
(negative) e¤ect when  = 0: However, with proactive consumers in the market (i.e.,  > 0), the
deceptive counterfeiter may improve his functional quality fD in response to the reduced demand
(see Lemma 2). This additional factor makes the licit distributor more willing to sell counterfeits,
so that the positive e¤ect does not always dominate the negative e¤ect.
(2) In those scenarios where qB > q
m
B , the strategy of setting higher q

B will increase the decep-
tive counterfeiters expected prot D by making counterfeits ourish more in the market. This
happens because the improved quality of the brand-name product results in an increase of the
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aggregate demand of brand-name and counterfeit goods, which in turn incentivizes the licit dis-
tributor to procure more deceptive counterfeits. This may be the cause of the initial failure of
the Scotch whisky company which improved her quality to combat deceptive counterfeits in the
Thailand market (see §1). Also, from the table, we conrm that the expected prot of the deceptive
counterfeiter is non-monotonic in pB for any   0; which can be explained similarly to Proposition
4(b).
(3) The expected consumer welfare ECSD has increased in more scenarios in the market with
 > 0 than in the market with  = 0. Similar to our explanation given in (1) above, this is because
the counterfeiter may improve his functional quality fD with proactive consumers. In general, for
any  2 [0; 1]; we show in online appendix A that if an anti-counterfeiting strategy improves the
average product quality in the market, then it improves the expected consumer welfare.
(4) The number of scenarios in which D is decreased or ECS

D is increased is not necessarily
monotonic in : For example, a change to qB from q
m
B decreases 

D in all scenarios when  = 0;
in 96.1% of scenarios when  = 0:25; and in 97.3% when  = 0:5: This result indicates that
anti-counterfeiting strategies are not necessarily more e¤ective as more consumers are proactive.
Similarly, we can show that more proactive consumers in the market does not necessarily benet
the brand-name company (i.e., B is non-monotonic in ). The reason is as follows. Proactive
consumers purchase products only when their expected utility is non-negative, considering the like-
lihood of receiving deceptive counterfeits unknowingly. As more consumers are proactive, therefore,
a smaller number of consumers will purchase products. This reduced aggregate demand for prod-
ucts discourages the licit distributor from taking the risk of selling deceptive counterfeits. Thus,
depending on which of the two e¤ects (i.e., reduced aggregate demand and reduced s) dominates,
the expected prot of the brand-name company as well as her market share may increase or decrease
with .
5.3 Comparison: Non-Deceptive vs. Deceptive
We now compare the e¤ect of each strategy against the non-deceptive counterfeiter with that against
the deceptive counterfeiter. Using the results presented in §5.1 and §5.2, we summarize in Table 4
whether the brand-name company should choose higher/lower quality or price than the case with no
counterfeiter in order to maximize her expected prot, and how such anti-counterfeiting strategies
a¤ect the expected prot of the counterfeiter and the expected consumer welfare. (If a dominant
e¤ect exists for a non-monotonic case, Table 4 reports only the dominant e¤ect.)
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Table 4. E¤ects of Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies: Non-Deceptive vs. Deceptive
Non-Deceptive Counterfeits Deceptive Counterfeits
Optimal Strategy N ECS

N Optimal Strategy 

D ECS

D
qB > q
m
B (low ) # " qB < qmB # " (low qD ) or # (high qD )
qB < q
m
B (high ) " #
pB < p
m
B # " pB > pmB l " (low qD ) or # (high qD )
From Table 4, we can draw the following insights:
(1) The optimal strategy of the brand-name company (that maximizes her expected prot) di¤ers
depending on whether she faces the non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeiter. For example, reducing
price is optimal against the non-deceptive counterfeiter, whereas raising price is optimal against
the deceptive counterfeiter.
(2) Even when the optimal strategy of the brand-name company is the same against both non-
deceptive and deceptive counterfeiters, its impact on the counterfeiters expected prot and the
expected consumer welfare may not be the same. For example, when  is high, setting a lower
quality level than the case with no counterfeiter improves the brand-name companys expected
prot against either type of the counterfeiter. While this strategy is e¤ective against the deceptive
counterfeiter (i.e., reduces D ), it does not work well against the non-deceptive counterfeiter (i.e.,
increases N ). Moreover, its impact on the expected consumer welfare may not be the same across
the two types of the counterfeiter, either.
(3) An ideal anti-counterfeiting strategy should improve the brand-name companys expected prot,
reduce the counterfeiters expected prot, and improve the expected consumer welfare. The pricing
strategy is such an ideal strategy against the non-deceptive counterfeiter. For the other cases, a
brand-name company or the government should carefully consider a trade-o¤ among those three
objectives in implementing an anti-counterfeiting strategy.
6 Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies: Marketing and Enforcement
In this section, we consider two other anti-counterfeiting strategies that are commonly used in
practice. The rst strategy we will consider is the marketing campaign that educates consumers
about the adversity of counterfeit goods. For example, an electronic manufacturer may emphasize
the fact that counterfeit electronics lack in safety features. This strategy helps reduce the brand
value the counterfeit steals from the brand-name product, i.e., reduce : The second strategy we will
consider is the direct enforcement e¤orts to increase the chances to seize counterfeit products, .
In executing these strategies, the brand-name company often collaborates with other organizations
or the government. For example, French luxury goods association Comite Colbert launched a
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campaign (using playful slogans such as real ladies dont like fake) in response to the threat of
the counterfeit, and the French police raided the clandestine workshops making Hermes counterfeit
accessories, of which the surveillance was part of an investigation into the international crime ring
that robs many brands (Wellman 2012). Since the brand-name company does not have a full control
of these parameters  and , we do not consider the brand-name companys optimal choices of these
parameters; instead, we examine how reducing  or increasing  will a¤ect rmsexpected prots
and expected consumer welfare.
First, let us consider the market in which the brand-name company faces the non-deceptive
counterfeiter. It is intuitive that both the marketing campaign and the enforcement strategy will
improve the expected prot of the brand-name company and reduce the expected prot of the
non-deceptive counterfeiter. However, we can show that both strategies hurt expected consumer
welfare for the following reasons. The market campaign makes those consumers who purchase non-
deceptive counterfeits enjoy the counterfeit brand less, resulting in a welfare loss. The enforcement
strategy makes counterfeits less likely to reach the market, and hence it makes the non-deceptive
counterfeiter more reluctant to invest in quality improvement. Therefore, consumers will su¤er
from less availability of non-deceptive counterfeits (which are cheaper substitutes for brand-name
goods) as well as from their lower quality.
Next, we examine the e¤ectiveness of two anti-counterfeiting strategies against the deceptive
counterfeiter. The following proposition shows that the e¤ectiveness of these strategies di¤ers
signicantly from that against the non-deceptive counterfeiter.
Proposition 5 For any given qB and pB;
(a) (Marketing) When  = 0; reducing  has no impact on B and 

D , whereas it reduces ECS

D .
When  > 0, reducing  decreases D , but it can increase or reduce 

B and ECS

D .
(b) (Enforcement) When  = 0; increasing  improves B , reduces 

D , and improves ECS

D :
When  > 0, increasing  reduces D , but it can increase or reduce 

B and ECS

D .
Proposition 5(a) suggests that special care must be taken when implementing the marketing cam-
paign against the deceptive counterfeiter. For the case when no consumers are proactive (i.e.,
 = 0), the marketing campaign has no impact on the rmsexpected prots because consumers
do not take into account the possibility of receiving counterfeits unknowingly. This result is ex-
pected. On the other hand, proactive consumers correctly expect that they will derive less utilities
when receiving deceptive counterfeits unknowingly. Thus, when  > 0, the marketing campaign
can reduce the expected prot of the deceptive counterfeiter by discouraging proactive consumers
from purchasing products. However, it could backre the brand-name company because proactive
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consumers reduce their consumption of brand-name products as well. For example, a large bever-
age company in Korea su¤ered from a sales drop of 15% after their counterfeiting problems were
broadcasted in a TV program (Choi 2009). Finally, unlike the case when  = 0, this strategy could
improve expected consumer welfare when  > 0 because a smaller number of proactive consumers
purchase products and hence receive low-quality deceptive counterfeits.
Proposition 5(b) shows that when no proactive consumers exist in the market (i.e.,  = 0),
the enforcement strategy works well against the deceptive counterfeiter. However, contrary to a
common belief, this strategy may reduce the expected prot of the brand-name company and also
hurt expected consumer welfare in the market where proactive consumers exist (i.e.,  > 0). This
result can be explained as follows. Similar to the impact of this strategy on the non-deceptive
counterfeiter (discussed above), by increasing the risk of counterfeiting, this strategy makes the
deceptive counterfeiter reluctant to invest in quality improvement. While the lower quality of non-
deceptive counterfeits helps the brand-name company regain its market share in quality competition,
the lower quality of deceptive counterfeits reduces the perceived quality of products in the market
with proactive consumers, hence reducing the aggregate demand for both brand-name goods and
deceptive counterfeits. In this case, consumers also su¤er from the lower quality of deceptive
counterfeits although fewer consumers will receive deceptive counterfeits unknowingly. In online
appendix B, we further study how di¤erent values of  a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of these strategies.
7 Extension: Risk of Counterfeiting
In this section, we extend our base model to the case where the probability of counterfeits getting
conscated is a decreasing function of their functional quality. This is plausible in some situations
because those consumers who have su¤ered due to the low quality of counterfeits can report them
to the authorities, which may lead to the raid of counterfeit factories or distributors. For example,
if the fake furniture mentioned in Barboza (2011) had functioned as well as its genuine furniture, a
consumer might have not discovered that the furniture he/she has purchased is, in fact, counterfeit.
Specically, suppose that a counterfeiter will get caught by the authorities with the probability of
 1fi for i = N or D, and that a licit distributor will get caught with the probability of s 2fD:
We assume 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, so that the lower the quality of counterfeit goods, the higher the
detection probabilities become.3
3We do not consider the case where the probability of the illicit distributor getting caught for selling non-deceptive
counterfeits is decreasing with the quality of non-deceptive counterfeits. Such a case is unlikely in practice because
consumers already know what they purchase. For example, a street vendor who sells $10 fake watches is not more
likely to get caught, as the quality of those watches gets worse. Furthermore, this probability does not a¤ect our
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When the non-deceptive counterfeiter exists in the market, it is easy to see that the price
decisions of the illicit distributor and the counterfeiter in stages 3 and 2, respectively, are unchanged.
In stage 1, the counterfeiter chooses his optimal functional quality fN to maximize his expected
prot, which is modied from (4) as follows:
N (fN ) =
p2B(1   + 1fN )(fN + qB)
8qB f(1  )qB   fNg   tNf
2
N :
Similar to Lemma 1, we can show that fN = f , f or f

N 2 (f; f) that satises @

N
@fN
jfN=fN = 0;
depending on the value of tN and whether N (f)  N (f).
When the deceptive counterfeiter exists in the market, in stage 3, the licit distributor chooses
its optimal fraction s of counterfeits by solving the following problem (which is modied from
(6)):
max
s2[0;1]
sf1  s+ 2fDg(pB   wD)

1  pB
(1  s)qB + sqD  
(1  )pB
qB

  (s  2fD)l: (12)
In stages 2 and 1, the counterfeiter decides wD and fD, respectively, to maximize his expected
prot given by:
D(wD; fD) = wDs
(1   + 1fD)

1  pB
(1  s)qB + s(fD + qB)  
(1  )pB
qB

  tDf2D:
When  = 0; by following the procedure similar to that in the base model, we obtain the closed-
form expressions of s and w as follows: s = 1+2fD2   lqB2(pB wD)(qB pB) and wD = pB  r
lpB
(1  pB
qB
)(1+2fD)
: In this case, unlike the base model (c.f. Lemma 2), fD > f is possible even
without proactive consumers. This is because high-quality counterfeits can induce the licit distrib-
utor to procure more counterfeits (i.e., increase s) by reducing the probability of the distributor
getting caught. When  > 0; similar to the base model, we can show the existence of s, w and
fD ; but their closed-form expressions are not available.
Using the equilibrium analysis above, we show in the following corollary that the main results
in the base model continue to hold in this extended model.
Corollary 1 Suppose the probability of a counterfeiter getting caught is    1fi for i = N or D,
and the probability of a licit distributor getting caught is s  2fD; where 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. Then:
(a) Proposition 1 continues to hold.
(b) Propositions 2, 3 and 4 continue to hold except that the conditions in part (c) are di¤erent.
(c) Proposition 5 continues to hold except that increasing  can increase or reduce B and ECS

D
when  = 0.
results due to our assumption that lN = 0 (see §3).
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Corollary 1 shows that a more general risk model in this section a¤ects only the impact of enforce-
ment strategy (that increases ) on B and ECS

D . In the base model, Proposition 5 has shown
that this strategy always improves B and ECS

D when  = 0. However, Corollary 1(c) shows
that this strategy can either increase or decrease B and ECS

D even when  = 0. The intuition
is as follows. In the base model, when  = 0; the optimal functional quality fD of the deceptive
counterfeiter is always f . However, as we have discussed above, fD > f is possible in the extended
model. In this case, as the investment for quality improvement becomes more risky with higher
, the deceptive counterfeiter may nd it optimal to reduce fD . This in turn increases the risk
of the licit distributor selling counterfeits (through 2fD) as well as his own risk of getting caught
(through 1fD). As a result of these two opposing e¤ects, we nd that increasing  can increase or
decrease fD . When f

D is increased, it will reduce the risk of the licit distributor selling deceptive
counterfeits, hence increasing the fraction s of deceptive counterfeits; consequently, it could hurt
the expected prot of the brand-name company, B : On the other hand, when f

D is decreased,
consumers will su¤er from the lower quality of deceptive counterfeits; thus, it could reduce ECSD :
8 Concluding Remarks
Today counterfeit products are being produced and consumed in virtually all economies (OECD
2008). While easy-to-manufacture goods had dominated counterfeit supply until a decade ago, there
has been an alarming expansion of product categories being infringed. As a result of outsourcing
and o¤shoring, counterfeiters have easy access to modern technology and equipment, and they
are capable of producing high-quality replicas. Consumers are not easily deceived by fake goods
that are sold by vendors in open markets and unknown internet sites. These changing business
conditions require industry and governments to enhance their understanding of the current and
potential counterfeiters they may face and to develop strategies to limit their activities.
To aid the e¤orts of industry and governments to combat counterfeiting, we have developed
a normative model of counterfeiting. Our model captures the recent changes in counterfeiting
supply and demand that are not addressed in the previous literature. For example, the previous
literature focuses on the pricing decision of a counterfeiter, assuming that the quality level of his
goods is xed, and he is capable of selling his goods, even deceptive ones, directly to consumers.
In contrast, our model takes into account the strategic decisions of a counterfeiter regarding his
price and functional quality; and the fundamental di¤erence between non-deceptive and deceptive
counterfeits in consumers awareness, distribution channels, and penalty on illegal distribution.
We have also considered the case when a fraction of consumers are proactive. Modeling these
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factors explicitly enables us to evaluate several anti-counterfeiting strategies against both types of
counterfeiters, and to draw novel managerial insights.
Our analysis highlights that the strategies which are e¤ective in combating the non-deceptive
counterfeiter may not work well against the deceptive counterfeiter. Moreover, even if strategies
help the brand-name company improve her expected prot, they may not be e¤ective in limiting
counterfeit activities, and they can even hurt consumers. For example:
- The strategy of improving the quality of brand-name products is e¤ective in combating the non-
deceptive counterfeiter only when the non-deceptive counterfeit steals an insignicant amount of
brand value. This strategy may not be used in combating the non-deceptive counterfeiter in other
situations or in combating the deceptive counterfeiter.
- The strategy of reducing the price of brand-name products is an ideal strategy against the non-
deceptive counterfeiter. In contrast, when facing the deceptive counterfeiter, it can hurt the brand-
name companys prot as well as consumer welfare, and also benet the deceptive counterfeiter
inadvertently.
- The marketing campaign and the enforcement strategy are e¤ective in combating the non-deceptive
counterfeiter, but they may not benet the brand-name company or consumers when consumers
are proactive toward deceptive counterfeits.
Therefore, industries and governments should understand the type of potential counterfeiters and
the characteristics of consumers in order to design e¤ective strategies to combat counterfeits. With-
out such understanding, anti-counterfeiting strategies could be ine¤ective and hurt consumer wel-
fare.
Although our model captures the salient features of counterfeiting, we make several assump-
tions to maintain tractability. First, we do not consider the e¤ect of positive or negative externality
of counterfeits on brand-name products. For some product categories, counterfeits help to increase
the size of user base of brand-name products, which refers to positive externality. A typical example
is software piracy (Conner and Rumelt 1991). The negative externality of counterfeits refers to the
negative impact of counterfeits on the value of a brand. More counterfeits in the market, less pres-
tigious the brand becomes. Second, we assume that consumers are risk-neutral. In some situations,
consumers show risk-prone or irrational behavior. For example, fraudsters use their phony pharma-
ceutical websites to take advantage of the recent swine-u fears. Some consumers who are anxious
for their children take risks of buying fake vaccines and bogus remedies from unknown websites
(Taylor 2009). Behavioral research would help enrich our understanding of the risk attitudes of
consumers. Third, our model does not capture the details of specic anti-counterfeiting technolo-
gies; e.g., technologies to authenticate products such as NanoInk (http://www.nanoink.net) and
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technologies to track and trace the movement of products through supply chains such as RFID.
Yet, their broad use and success has been limited by a variety of factors, including the ability of
counterfeiters to adopt or copy the technologies (OECD 2008). Our current model captures the role
of these technologies to some degree: the former type of technologies is captured by the marginal
cost of developing functional quality of a counterfeit product (i.e., with such technologies installed,
a counterfeiter needs to spend more e¤ort to copy authentic goods) and the latter type of tech-
nologies is captured by seizure rate (i.e., with RFID installed, the likelihood of seizing counterfeits
increases). More detailed cost-benet analysis of these technologies in specic industrial settings
would be interesting future research.
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Online Appendix
Appendix A. Proofs of Analytical Results
We use (A1) and (A2) to indicate the following assumptions we have made earlier: (A1) qB > qN =
fN + qB and qB > qD = fD + qB; (A2) 1  pBqB > 0 and 1 
pB pN
qB qN > 0 so that mB > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1: From (4), we obtain @
2N
@f2N
=
(1 )p2B
4f(1 )qB fNg3   2tN ; which is positive if
tN <
(1 )p2B
8f(1 )qB fNg3 . Thus, if tN <
(1 )p2B
8f(1 )qB fg3 ; 

N is convex in fN 2 [f; f ], so fN = f when
N (f)  N (f): Otherwise, fN can be f or fN 2 (f; f) that satises the rst order condition
@N
@fN
jfN=fN = 0. 
Remark A su¢ cient condition for fN > f is tN <
(1 )p2B
16ff(1 )qB fg2 ; which can be obtained from
@N
@fN
jfN=f = (1 )p
2
B
8f(1 )qB fg2   2tNf > 0:
Proof of Lemma 2: When  = 0; from (8), @

D
@fD
=  2tDfD < 0; so fD = f . When  > 0;
we next show that fD = f if tD  tD: For any fD 2 (f; f ]; D (wD (fD); f)  D (wD (fD); fD)
if tD  (1   )wD (fD)fmD (wD (fD); fD)   mD (wD (fD); f)g(f2D   f2) 1: Suppose tD  tD 
max
fD2(f;f ]
(1 )wD (fD)fmD (wD (fD); fD) mD (wD (fD); f)g(f2D f2) 1. Then, for any fD 2 (f; f ];
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D (w

D (f); f)  D (wD (fD); f)  D (wD (fD); fD), where the rst inequality is due to the
optimality of wD (f) given f; and the second inequality follows from tD  tD: Therefore, fD = f:
In the rest of the proof, we show tD > 0 in two steps: we rst show that s is increasing
in fD for given wD; and then show that the market share of the deceptive counterfeiter, mD =
s

1  (s)	 ; is increasing in fD for any given wD. Then from the denition of tD, tD > 0: Let
LD denote the expected prot of the licit distributor given in (6). Then
@LD
@s = (1  2s)(pB   wD)

1  	  s(1  s)(pB   wD)@@s   l; and
@2LD
@s@fD
= (2  3s)(pB   wD) pBsf(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)g2 + 2s(1  s)(pB   wD)
pBs(qB fD qB)
f(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)g3 ;
where the rst term is positive because we know from §4.2 that s < 0:5 and wD  pB; and the
second term is also positive according to (A1). Therefore, @LD@s is increasing in fD. Since s

satises @LD@s js=s = 0 due to the concavity of LD with respect to s, s is increasing in fD.
Next, we show that mD increases as fD increases from fDL to fDH for given wD: Suppose this
does not hold. Then, LD satises the following:
LD(s
(fDH); fDH) = s(fDH)(1  s(fDH))(pB  wD)

1  (s(fDH); fDH)
	  s(fDH)l
 s(fDL)(1  s(fDH))(pB   wD)

1  (s(fDL); fDL)
	  s(fDH)l
< s(fDL)(1  s(fDH))(pB   wD)

1  (s(fDL); fDH)
	  s(fDH)l
< s(fDL)(1 s(fDL))(pB wD)

1  (s(fDL); fDH)
	 s(fDL)l = LD(s(fDL); fDH);
where the rst inequality follows from our premise, the second inequality follows from @

@fD
=
  pBsf(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)g2 < 0 for xed s, and the last inequality follows from
@s
@fD
> 0. However, this
contradicts the condition that s(fDH) maximizes the licit distributors prot LD given fDH .
Therefore, mD is increasing in fD for given wD; and tD > 0. 
Remark A su¢ cient condition for fD > f is tD < tD  max
fD2(f;f ]
(1  )wD (f)fmD (wD (f); fD) 
mD (w

D (f); f)g(f2D   f2) 1: We show this by contradiction. Suppose fD = f and dene fmax =
argmax
fD2(f;f ]
(1 )wD (f)fmD (wD (f); fD) mD (wD (f); f)g(f2D f2) 1. Then D (wD (fmax); fmax) 
D (w

D (f); fmax) > 

D (w

D (f); f); where the rst inequality is due to the optimality of w

D (fmax)
given fmax, and the second inequality follows from tD < tD. However, this contradicts our premise
that fD = f . Therefore, f

D > f if tD < tD.
Proof of Proposition 1: (a) The proof proceeds as follows: We rst obtain qmB and q

B, and
then derive the condition for qB > q
m
B . When there is no counterfeiter, the expected prot of the
brand-name company is given as follows:
mB = (pB   c)

1  pB
qB

  tBq2B; (13)
where c (> 0) is the marginal cost of the brand-name product. From (13), @
2mB
@q2B
=  2(pB c)pB
q3B
 
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2tB < 0; so we obtain qmB =
(pB c)pB
2tBq
m2
B
from the rst order condition. When the non-deceptive
counterfeiter exists in the market, we obtain B after substituting p

N and w

N into mB in (1) as
follows:
B = (pB   c)mB   tBq2B = (pB   c)

1  (1  )pB
4f(1  )qB   fNg
  (3 + )pB
4qB

  tBq2B: (14)
From (14), when fN = f or f ,
@2B
@q2B
=  pB c2 (pB(1 )(1 )
2
(qB qN )3 +
pB(3+)
q3B
)  2tB < 0 due to (A1). In
this case, from the rst order condition of (14), qB =
pB c
2tB
n
(1 )(1 )pB
4f(1 )qB fN (qB)g2 +
(3+)pB
4q2B
o
:
We next show by contradiction that qB > q
m
B when  < 1   ( q
m
B qN (qmB )
qmB
)2: Suppose  <
1   ( qmB qN (qmB )qmB )
2 and qB  qmB : For fNH > fNL; from (4), we obtain @

N (fNH)
@qB
  @N (fNL)@qB =
( 1)p2B(fNH fNL)(1 )f(1 )qB (fNH+fNL)=2g
4f(1 )qB fNHg2f(1 )qB fNLg2 < 0 due to (A1); so f

N is decreasing in qB: Then
qB =
pB c
2tB
n
(1 )(1 )pB
4f(1 )qB fN (qB)g2 +
(3+)pB
4q2B
o
 pB c2tB f
(1 )(1 )pB
4f(1 )qmB fN (qmB )g2+
(3+)pB
4qm2B
g > (pB c)pB
2tBq
m2
B
= qmB ;
where the rst inequality follows from qB  qmB and fN (qB)  fN (qmB ); and the second inequality
follows from  < 1   ( qmB qN (qmB )qmB )
2: Thus, there is a contradiction, so qB > q
m
B when  < 1  
(
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
)2. The case in which   1   ( qmB qN (qmB )qmB )
2 can be shown similarly and is hence
omitted.
(b) To establish the result in the proposition, it su¢ ces to show that N is decreasing in qB: The
proof proceeds in two steps: We rst show that N decreases in qB for any given fN ; and then
show that this result holds even when fN changes with qB. First, from (4), we obtain
@N
@qB
=
(1 )p2Bfq2B( 1)+2qBfN ( 1)+f2Ng
4q2Bf(1 )qB fNg2
; which is negative by (A1) for any given fN . Next, we consider
the case in which fN changes from fN1 to fN2 when qB is increased from qBL to qBH . In this case,
N (fN1; qBL)  N (fN2; qBL) > N (fN2; qBH); where the rst inequality follows from fN (qBL) =
fN1 and the second inequality is due to
@N
@qB
< 0 8fN .
(c) We rst prove that ECSN is increasing in qB for given fN ; and then prove that ECS

N decreases
when fN is decreased from fNH to fNL for any given qB.
To prove that ECSN is increasing in qB; it su¢ ces to show that
@CSN
@qB
> 0 for any given fN
because @CSB@qB > 0 from the denition of CSB. Now suppose that qB is increased from qBL to
qBH . Then qN is also increased from qNL to qNH given fN ; b is decreased from bL to bH ; ande is decreased from eL to eH . Using pN = 3pBqN4qB , we can rewrite (9) and nd CSN (qBH) >R eHbL    3pB4qBH  qNHd + R 1eH (qBH   pB)d > R eHbL    3pB4qBH  qNHd + R eLeH    3pB4qBH  qNHd +R 1eL(qBH pB)d > CSN (qBL): The rst inequality holds because bL > bH and    3pB4qBH  qNH >
0 for  2 (bH ;bL): The second inequality holds because qBH   pB > qNH   pN for  2 (eH ;eL).
The third inequality follows from the fact that qBH > qBL and qNH > qNL:
Next, suppose fN is decreased from fNH to fNL for xed qB: Then b remains the same, wherease is decreased from e0  pB4f(1 )qB fNHg + 3pB4qB to e00  pB4f(1 )qB fNLg + 3pB4qB . Then,
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ECSN (fNH) = (1  )
R e0b    3pB4qB  (fNH + qB)d + R 1e0(qB   pB)d+  R 1pBqB (qB   pB)d
> (1  )
R e00b    3pB4qB  (fNH + qB)d + R e0e00(qB   pB)d + R 1e0(qB   pB)d+  R 1pBqB (qB   pB)d
> (1  )
R e00b    3pB4qB  (fNL + qB)d + R 1e00(qB   pB)d+  R 1pBqB (qB   pB)d = ECSN (fNL):
In the above, the rst inequality holds because

   3pB4qB

(fNH + qB) > qB   pB for  2 (e00;e0),
and the second inequality follows from fNH > fNL: 
Remark When fN 2 (f; f); assuming @
2fN
@q2B
 0; we can still obtain @2B
@q2B
< 0: From the rst order
condition of (14), qB =
pB c
2tB
f (1 )(1  @fN=@qB)pB
4f(1 )qB fN (qB)g2 +
(3+)pB
4q2B
g: The condition for qB > qmB then
becomes (1 )(1  @f

N=@qB)
4f(1 )qB fN (qB)g2 +
3+
4q2B
  1
qm2B
> 0: Unfortunately, this condition cannot be simplied
further to the form like  < 1   ( qmB qN (qmB )qmB )
2 because the closed-form expressions for fN and
@fN
@qB
are not available. The proof for (b) does not require fN = f or f; so it also holds for
fN 2 (f; f). For (c), suppose qB > qmB . From (11), @ECS

N
@qB
= [q2B(1  )f16(1  )q2B + p2B((15 +
)  16)g+ fNfp2B(15+)  16q2Bgf2(1 )qB   fNg+ p2Bq2B(1 )@fN=@qB] f(1  )qB   fNg 2 :
Then ECSN is decreasing in qB 2 [qmB ; qB] so that ECSN is lower at qB than at qmB if @f

N
@qB
<
  q2B(1 )f16(1 )q2B+p2B((15+) 16)g+fNfp2B(15+) 16q2Bgf2(1 )qB fNg
p2Bq
2
B(1 )f(1 )qB fNg2
:
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) From (13), @
2mB
@p2B
=   2qB < 0; so we obtain pmB =
qB+c
2 from the rst
order condition. Next, consider the market in which the non-deceptive counterfeiter exists. When
fN = f or f , from (14),
@2B
@p2B
=   1 2(qB qN ) 
3+
2qB
< 0 and pB =
qBq

D(1 )
2( 4qB+3qD+qD)+
qB+c
2 ; in this case,
pB < p
m
B due to (A1). When f

N 2 (f; f); we show @

B
@pB
j
pB=
qB+c
2
< 0, which then results in pB < p
m
B .
From (14), we obtain @

B
@pB
j
pB=
qB+c
2
=
(1 )f4f2N +4(2 1)fN qB+4( 1)q2B+(c qB)(c+qB)@fN=@pBg
16f(1 )qB fNg2
; which
is negative because: 4f2N   4(1  2)fNqB   4(1  )q2B   @f

N
@pB
(qB   c)(qB + c) < 4f2N   4(fN  
qB)f

N   4fNqB   @f

N
@pB
(qB   c)(qB + c) =  @f

N
@pB
(qB   c)(qB + c)  0; where the rst inequality is
based on (A1) and the second inequality holds because @f

N
@pB
 0 and qB > pB  c by (A2).
(b) The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1(b), and is hence omitted.
(c) The proof for the case in which fN = f or f is similar to that of Proposition 1(c). When f

N 2
(f; f); from (11), @ECS

N
@pB
= [ 2 f(1  )qB   fNg f16(1 )q2B+pBqB((15+) 16)+(pB(15+) 
16qB)f

Ng+p2BqB(1 )@fN=@pB] f(1  )qB   fNg 2 :Dene  = max
pB2[pB ;pmB ]
2 f(1  )qB   fNg f16(1 
)q2B + pBqB((15+ )  16)+ (pB(15+ )  16qB)fNgp 2B q 1B (1  ) 1 f(1  )qB   fNg 2 : Then
ECSN is increasing in pB 2 [pB; pmB ] so that ECSN is lower at pB than at pmB if @f

N
@pB
> : 
Proof of Proposition 3: (a) When the deceptive counterfeiter exists in the market with  = 0,
35
we obtain B after substituting s
 and wD into mB in (5) as follows:
B = (pB c)mB tBq2B = (pB c)
24(1  )
8<:12(1  pBqB ) + 12
s
l(1  pBqB )
pB
9=;+ (1  pBqB )
35 tBq2B:
(15)
From (15), @
2B
@q2B
= (pB   c)f pB(1+)q3B  
(4qB 3pB)(1 )
8(qB pB)q3B
q
lqBpB
qB pB g   2tB < 0 due to (A2), and
qB =
pB c
2tB
n
(1  )( pB
2q2B
+ 1
4q2B
q
lpBq

B
qB  pB ) +
pB
q2B
o
from the rst order condition. By the same
procedure in the proof of Proposition 1(a), we can prove by contradiction that qB < q
m
B if and only
if l < 4pB(1  pBqmB ): Since s
 = 12   12
r
l
pB(1  pBqB )
> 0; we nd that l < pB(1  pBqmB ) < 4pB(1 
pB
qmB
),
so we always have qB < q
m
B :
(b) To establish the result in the proposition, it su¢ ces to show that D is increasing in qB:When
 = 0; it is easy to see @

D
@qB
=
@D
@(1  pB
qB
)
pB
q2B
> 0 8fD from (8). Since fD =f 8qB, the result follows.
(c) When  = 0; from (11), @ECS

D
@qB
=  (1 )
n
p2B
q3B
s + 12

1  p2B
q2B

@s
@qB
o
(qB   qD )+12

1  p2B
q2B

f1 
(1  )sg: Using @s@qB > 0 and (A2), we obtain the condition given in Proposition 3(c). 
Remark When  > 0; both qB < q
m
B and q

B > q
m
B are possible as shown in Table 3. The condi-
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m
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2qmB
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pB
(1 s(qmB ))qmB+s(qmB )(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(qmB )(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m
B )))
 2g]; which can be obtained from @B@qB jqB=qmB < 0: In this
case, D is increasing in qB as in the case when  = 0 shown in the proof of Proposition 3(b). The
proof follows the same procedure as in that of Lemma 2, so we provide a sketch of the proof here.
For given wD and fD; we can show that s andmD are increasing in qB. Then when qB is increased
from qBL to qBH ; the following inequalities hold in equilibrium: D (w

D (qBH); f

D (qBH); qBH) 
D (w

D (qBL); f

D (qBL); qBH) > 

D (w

D (qBL); f

D (qBL); qBL): Finally, when  > 0; the condition
for @ECS

D
@qB
< 0 given in Proposition 3(c) is modied to the following: qD
n
2s @@qB + (1  
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o
: Unfortu-
nately, this condition cannot be simplied further since the closed-form expressions of s and
fD do not exist. The non-monotonicity of ECS

D is shown in Table 3.
Proof of Proposition 4: (a) From (15), @
2B
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=  1+qB  
1 
2p2B
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(qB pB)pB
n
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o
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@B
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qB(c+qB)
> 0 due to qB > pB  c by (A2). Therefore, by the concavity of
B , p

B > p
m
B :
(b) The non-monotonicity of D with respect to pB is shown in Table 3.
(c) When  = 0; from (11), @ECS

D
@pB
= (1   )[ spBqB

1  qDqB

+

1  pBqB

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@pB
(qD  
qB)  1g] + (pBqB   1): Using @s

@pB
< 0 and (A2), we obtain the condition given in Proposition 4(c).

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Remark When  > 0; both pB > p
m
B and p

B < p
m
B are possible as shown in Table 3. The
condition for pB > p
m
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qB+fD (pmB ))g2 g] > 0; where Y = 1 
(1 )pmB
qB
 
pmB
(1 s(pmB ))qB+s(pmB )(qB+fD (pmB )) : This can be obtained from
@B
@pB
jpB=pmB > 0: The condition for
@ECSD
@pB
> 0 given in Proposition 4(c) is modied to the following: qD
n
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2
2
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  1 + : Unfortunately, this
condition cannot be simplied further since the closed-form expressions of s and fD do not exist.
The non-monotonicity of ECSD is established in Table 3.
Proof of Proposition 5: When  = 0, we observe from (15) that B does not change with ;
and that B is increasing in . When  > 0; similar to the proof of Lemma 2, we can show that the
aggregate demand, (1  ); for the brand-name product and the deceptive counterfeit is increasing
in  and decreasing in ; and that the fraction of the brand-name product, (1  s); is decreasing
in  and increasing in . The non-monotonicity of B is shown in our numerical experiments
presented in online appendix B. The proofs for D and ECS

D are similar to those of Proposition
3(b)-(c), and hence are omitted. 
Proposition 6 For any  2 [0; 1]; if any anti-counterfeiting strategy improves the average product
quality in the market, (1  s)qB + s(fD + qB), then ECSD increases.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let us examine @ECS

D
@qB
: From the denition of CSD,
@CSD
@qB
> 0 if and
only if @@qB f(1   s)qB + sqDg > 0: Since
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@qB
> 0 if
@
@qB
f(1  s)qB + sqDg > 0: The results for the other parameters can be shown similarly. 
Proof of Corollary 1: (a) Suppose fN = f or f: We can obtain
@B
@qB
by replacing  in the base
model with    1fN : To show that Proposition 1(a) continues to hold, we need to prove that fN
is decreasing in qB:For fNH > fNL;
@N (fNH)
@qB
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)f(1 )qB (fNH+fNL)=2g
4f(1 )qB fNHg2f(1 )qB fNLg2 ;
which is negative due to (A1). Then, following the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition
1(a), we can show qB > q
m
B if and only if  < 1 
n
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
o2
: For Proposition 1(b), when fN is
given, @

N
@qB
=
(1 +1fN )p2Bfq2B( 1)+2qBfN ( 1)+f2Ng
4q2Bf(1 )qB fNg2
< 0 due to (A1). When fN changes from fN1
to fN2 as qB is increased from qBL to qBH , N (fN1; qBL)  N (fN2; qBL) > N (fN2; qBH); where
the rst inequality follows from fN (qBL) = fN1 and the second inequality is due to
@N
@qB
< 0 8fN .
For Proposition 1(c), to prove that ECSN is increasing in qB; it su¢ ces to show that
@CSN
@qB
> 0:
37
Since @CSN@qB does not depend on  when fN is given, Proposition 1(c) continues to hold.
(b) We can show that the proof for Proposition 2 also applies to the case with  1fN similarly to
Proposition 1, except part (c) when fN 2 (f; f):With the extension, @ECS

N
@pB
= f(1  )qB   fNg 2
[p2B
@fN
@pB
f 1fN (2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qB 
2qB+f

N ) qB(( 1)1qB+ 1)g 1: Then ECSN is increasing in pB 2 [pB; pmB ] so that ECSN
is lower at pB than at p
m
B if
@fN
@pB
> :
To show that Proposition 3(a) continues to hold, when  = 0; we can prove by contradiction that
qB < q
m
B if and only if (1+2fD)l < 4pB(1  pBqmB ) by the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition
1(a). Since s = 1+2fD2   12
r
l(1+2fD)
pB(1  pBqB )
> 0; we obtain l < pB(1  pBqmB )(1+2fD) <
4pB
1+2fD
(1  pBqmB );
so qB < q
m
B always holds. For Proposition 4(a),
@B
@pB
j
pB=
qB+c
2
= c(1 +1fD)2(c+qB)
q
l(qB c)(1+2fD)
qB(c+qB)
> 0,
so pB > p
m
B . For Propositions 3(b) and 4(b), we can show that, with the extension, s
 and
mD are increasing in qB and decreasing in pB for given wD and fD. Then, when qB is increased
from qBL to qBH ; the following inequalities hold in equilibrium: D (w

D (qBH); f

D (qBH); qBH) 
D (w

D (qBL); f

D (qBL); qBH) > 

D (w

D (qBL); f

D (qBL); qBL): Similarly, when pB is decreased from
pBH to pBL; the following inequalities hold in equilibrium: D (w

D (pBL); f

D (pBL); pBL) 
D (w

D (pBH); f

D (pBH); pBL) > 

D (w

D (pBH); f

D (pBH); pBH). Propositions 3(c) and 4(c) can be
shown similarly to Proposition 2(c).
(c) The proofs of D and ECS

D are similar to those of Proposition 3(b)-(c). When  = 0; the
non-monotonicity of B or ECS

D with respect to  can be shown numerically as follows. Set
qB = 1; pB = 0:5; tB = tD = 0:01; c = 0:01;  = 0:1; l = 0:02; and 1 = 2 = 0:1: As  increases
from 0:2 to 0:3, B increases from 0:174 to 0:181 and ECS

D increases from 0:070 to 0:076: As 
increases from 0:3 to 0:4; B decreases from 0:181 to 0:173 and ECS

D decreases from 0:070 to
0:069: 
Appendix B. Numerical Experiments
This section contains our numerical study that examines the e¤ectiveness of the marketing campaign
and the enforcement strategy against the deceptive counterfeiter. Similar to the numerical study
presented in §5.2, we have constructed 1024 scenarios for  = 0; 0:25 or 0:5; using the parameter
values shown in the bottom of Table 5, so that they cover various possible scenarios and also satisfy
positive s in equilibrium. We computed the di¤erence in rmsexpected prots and expected
consumer welfare associated with the adjacent values of  or  for a xed set of other parameter
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values. There are 3 increments of  or  for a set of 256 possible values of (ti; c; ; l); so there are
768 scenarios for which we can examine the direction of changes with a decrease of  or an increase
of . The results are summarized in Table 5, which reads as follows: for example, when  = 0:5;
reducing  increased B in 33.1% of 768 scenarios, decreased 

D in all scenarios, and increased
ECSD in 13.9% of 768 scenarios.
Table 5. E¤ects of Marketing Campaigns and Enforcement against Deceptive Counterfeits
E¤ects of Reducing  E¤ects of Increasing 
B " D # ECSD " B " D # ECSD "
 = 0 no change no change 0 1 1 1
 = 0:25 0.374 1 0.260 1 1 0.952
 = 0:5 0.331 1 0.139 0.990 1 0.927
(Note) Each number in the table indicates a percent of scenarios for the corresponding e¤ect. We used the fol-
lowing parameters: t 2{0.005,0.01,0.015,0.02},  2{0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4},  2{0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4}, l 2{0.005,0.01,0.015,0.02},
c 2{0.005,0.01,0.015,0.02}, f = 0:1; and f = (1  )  qB   0:01. (qB ; pB) is xed at (qmB ; pmB ).
Table 5 conrms the results stated in Proposition 5. In addition, similar to the quality and pricing
strategies discussed in §5.2, these strategies are not necessarily more e¤ective as more consumers
are proactive with higher .
Appendix C. Extension: Price Decision of Licit Distributor
Suppose, instead of the brand-name company, the licit distributor decides the retail price of the
brand-name product, pB, when combating the deceptive counterfeiter. The brand-name company
instead decides the wholesale price, wB; to the licit distributor. The rest of the decisions remain
the same as in the base model. The sequence of decisions is as follows: After observing the quality
qB and wholesale price wB of the brand-name product, the deceptive counterfeiter decides his
functional quality fD and wholesale price wD in stages 1 and 2, respectively. In stage 3, the licit
distributor decides a fraction of deceptive counterfeits s; and then decides the retail price pB. Note
that the licit distributor can source products from the brand-name company at the wholesale price
wB; and/or from the deceptive counterfeiter at the wholesale price wD; should counterfeit goods
reach the market.
We analyze this model backwards. In stage 3, the licit distributor rst solves the following
problem to determine pB:
max
pB
(1  s) fpB   swD   (1  s)wBg

1  pB
(1  s)qB + s(fD + qB)  
(1  )pB
qB

  sl: (16)
One can verify from (16) that the prot of the licit distributor is concave in pB:We obtain from the
rst-order condition the optimal retail price: pB =
swD+(1 s)wB
2 +
1
2(

(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB) +
1 
qB
) 1.
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Since wD < wB and fD + qB < qB; the distributor charges a lower retail price pB when the
fraction of counterfeits s is larger or the fraction of proactive consumers  is larger.
Next, to nd the optimal fraction s, the licit distributor solves the following problem which
is obtained by substituting pB into (16):
max
s
1
4
(1  s)


(1  s)qB + s(fD + qB) +
1  
qB


"
swD + (1  s)wB  


(1  s)qB + s(fD + qB) +
1  
qB
 1#2
  sl (17)
Due to complexity, however, it is not possible to nd the closed-form expression of s from (17).
Although the part of our analysis in the base model does not rely on its closed-form expression,
the impact of any anti-counterfeiting strategy on s becomes prohibitively complex to obtain any
analytical result. Thus, we conduct extensive numerical experiments to examine the e¤ects of the
anti-counterfeiting strategies. We use the same set of parameters as in online appendix B. For
each case with  = 0 and  = 0:5, there are 1024 scenarios in which we can investigate the anti-
counterfeiting strategies that change quality or price from the case with no counterfeiter to the
optimal levels. On the other hand, similar to Table 5, there are 768 scenarios for which we can
examine the anti-counterfeiting strategies that reduce  or increase . We present a summary of
the results in Table 6, which reads similarly to Table 5.
Table 6. E¤ects of Quality and Pricing Strategies in the Extended Model
 = 0  = 0:5
B " D # ECSD " B " D # ECSD "
qmB ! qB 1 0.320 0.672 1 0.998 0.647
wmB ! wB 1 0.508 0.805 1 0.998 0.647
 # no change no change 0 0.135 1 0.135
 " 1 1 1 0.779 1 0.798
Table 6 shows that the e¤ects of anti-counterfeiting strategies remain directionally true in this
extended model. For example, as the price changes from wmB to w

B , 

D and ECS

D can increase
or decrease; this is consistent with Proposition 4. Also, as stated in Proposition 5, when  = 0,
reducing  has no impact on B and 

D ; but reduces ECS

D , whereas increasing  reduces 

D
and increases B as well as ECS

D ; when  > 0, reducing  or increasing  reduces 

D , but it
can increase or reduce B and ECS

D . One notable exception is that when  = 0; changing q
m
B
to qB can increase 

D although it always reduces 

D in the base model. This happens because
of the additional lever (i.e., determining pB as well as s) the licit distributor has in this extended
model. In response to the change of qB; the distributor can increase the aggregate demand for both
brand-name and counterfeit goods by reducing the retail price pB: As a result, we nd that the
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distributor may increase or decrease the fraction of counterfeits, s; in response to this strategy,
which thus creates a non-monotonic e¤ect on D .
41
